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DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN?  
THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE AND  
ENTITY LAW CONVERGENCE PATTERNS  
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
Matthew G. Doré* 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The internal affairs rule is probably the most well-established choice-
of-law principle in American corporate law. This rule holds that the law 
governing a corporation’s internal matters, like shareholder/management 
relations, is the law of the state/country where the corporation is organized.1 
As an example, a corporation may incorporate in Delaware, thereby 
adopting Delaware’s corporate governance rules, and at the same time 
locate its company headquarters and conduct all business elsewhere. The 
internal affairs rule stands in marked contrast to the real seat choice-of-law 
doctrine that continental European countries have traditionally applied in 
the field of company (corporate) law. Under the latter approach, a business 
entity must organize itself under the company law of its “real seat” 
jurisdiction. The company’s real seat is the state/country where the 
company’s administrative headquarters—its nerve center—and presumably 
its center of interest is located.2 
Because the internal affairs rule permits business managers to select the 
incorporating jurisdiction based on corporate governance considerations 
alone, it is generally agreed that the rule facilitates a market for corporate 
laws across the United States.3 Scholars from a variety of perspectives have 
long argued that Delaware dominates this market, and that Delaware’s 
dominance has in turn triggered a convergence of state corporate laws 
around permissive approaches to corporate governance that impose 
relatively few constraints on shareholders, managers, and other corporate 
                                                                                                                                       
 *  Richard M. & Anita Calkins Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University. 
 1. See generally FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.2 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining 
the internal affairs rule); see also infra notes 8–18 and accompanying text. 
 2. See generally Werner F. Ebke, The “Real Seat” Doctrine in the Conflict of Corporate 
Laws, 36 INT’L LAW. 1015 (2002) (explaining the real seat doctrine); see also infra notes 27–30 
and accompanying text. 
 3. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 662 (“Because of the [internal affairs doctrine], states can compete to 
supply corporate law separate from tax law, regulatory law, or other benefits. To obtain tax and 
other benefits in a particular state, a corporation might need to locate a plant or other assets in that 
particular state. By incorporating in a different state, the corporation can choose among the 
particular beneficial aspects of each state’s laws. Without the [internal affairs doctrine], the 
corporation would be forced to choose a single state’s bundle of laws, including corporate, tax, 
and regulatory law.”); see also infra notes 4 and 21–25. 
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participants.4 In contrast, because the real seat doctrine precludes a business 
from choosing a jurisdiction for its company law without also locating 
company headquarters there, European countries have historically been 
insulated from significant company law competition5 and have imposed 
more mandates relating to corporate governance than their U.S. 
counterparts.6 Contemporary developments in both Europe and the United 
States provide an interesting opportunity to consider, from a comparative 
perspective, whether these traditional patterns still hold. That is the purpose 
of this Article. 
Part I describes recent changes in European Union (EU) case law that 
have effectively replaced continental Europe’s real seat doctrine with the 
internal affairs rule. Part I also explains related EU legislative developments 
that make it easier for existing companies within the European Union to 
change their governing law. As Part II then shows, despite a number of 
predictions to the contrary, these EU changes have thus far failed to 
produce significant jurisdictional competition or convergence in the field of 
European company law, and no “Delaware of Europe” has emerged. 
Part III of the Article contrasts the European developments with nearly 
contemporaneous changes made to U.S. business association laws. In a 
remarkably short period of time during the early 1990s, U.S. unincorporated 
business association laws changed and converged dramatically as all 
jurisdictions rapidly enacted new laws authorizing limited liability 
companies (LLCs) and limited liability partnerships (LLPs). These novel 
unincorporated entity laws emerged and converged around common 
denominators across the country before it became clear that the internal 
affairs rule applied to them. 
                                                                                                                                       
 4. For example, nearly forty years ago, Professor William Cary and Judge Ralph Winter 
argued from opposing perspectives concerning the merits of Delaware law, yet both hypothesized 
that competitive pressures from Delaware had caused most states to adopt similar corporation 
codes. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 
YALE L.J. 663, 664–66 (1974) (describing the early history of New Jersey and Delaware’s 
competition for corporate charters and Delaware’s emergence as a leading source of American 
corporate law); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977) (arguing that investors favor Delaware because 
its corporate laws enhance shareholder value); see also William J. Carney, The Political Economy 
of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 303 (1997) (arguing that the 
“common market” in corporate laws that has long prevailed in the United States has produced 
corporate laws that provide relatively less regulation than their European counterparts). 
 5. See, e.g., Hanne S. Birkmose, A Market for Company Incorporations in the European 
Union—Is Überseering the Beginning of the End?, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 55, 56 (2005) 
(stating that under the real seat doctrine, jurisdictional competition in European business 
association laws has been “impossible and unwanted”); Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in 
European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 477, 479 (2004) (“[T]he ability of corporations to 
choose the applicable corporate law regime has long faced a formidable obstacle in the so-called 
real seat doctrine.”). 
 6. See Carney, supra note 4.  
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If the internal affairs rule and jurisdictional competition are key drivers 
of change and convergence of business association laws, one would expect 
different results than those described above. With competitive forces 
unleashed by a new EU internal affairs rule, company laws across Europe 
should have changed and converged around permissive corporate 
governance models that are more efficient than traditional European 
approaches. In the United States, where it was unclear whether the internal 
affairs rule applied to LLCs and LLPs, and where there had previously been 
little or no jurisdictional competition in the unincorporated business 
association field, business owners and jurisdictions should have been slow 
to embrace the novel entities. 
Part IV argues that the actual results support nuanced theories of 
jurisdictional competition and entity law convergence that have recently 
been advanced as alternatives to prevailing “market for corporate law” 
theories. These nuanced views recognize that convergence of business 
association laws (or not) is likely influenced by a variety of idiosyncratic 
factors, including forces that naturally resist efficiency-based convergence 
trends. At the same time, business association laws may converge for 
reasons other than economic efficiency. The failure of European company 
laws to converge despite new possibilities for jurisdictional competition 
within the European Union is an excellent example of the first 
phenomenon, while the rapid convergence of U.S. unincorporated business 
association laws illustrates the second. In sum, we should not be surprised 
that it has not been “déjà vu all over again”7 as the internal affairs rule takes 
root in Europe and in new unincorporated business association settings in 
the United States. As explained in the Article’s concluding section, we 
should instead use these disparate experiences as new opportunities to learn 
from comparative study in the business association law field. 
I. THE U.S. INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE, THE EUROPEAN REAL 
SEAT DOCTRINE, AND RECENT EU CHANGES 
This Part of the Article briefly explains the internal affairs rule and the 
real seat doctrine, the competing choice-of-law approaches that have 
respectively governed American corporate law, and the company law of 
continental Europe since the mid-nineteenth century. This Part also explains 
how, over the past dozen years, European Court of Justice decisions 
construing the EU Treaty have dramatically limited EU Member States’ 
ability to adhere to the real seat doctrine. These decisions, along with other 
legal developments in the European Union, now effectively require 
European countries to apply the internal affairs rule when resolving 
                                                                                                                                       
 7. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 30 (1998) (describing Mickey Mantle and Roger Maris 
repeatedly hitting back-to-back home runs in the early 1960s). 
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corporate choice-of-law questions, and thereby make competition and 
convergence in the field of European company law a real possibility. 
A.  THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE 
Like other legal persons in the United States, a corporation is subject to 
the laws of any state in which it conducts business. If the laws of more than 
one jurisdiction potentially apply to a dispute that involves the corporation, 
like a contract or tort lawsuit with multi-state dimensions, ordinary choice-
of-law principles determine which law controls.8 Since at least the 1860s, 
however, a unique choice-of-law rule has traditionally applied to corporate 
governance questions.9 The “internal affairs” rule dictates that the law of 
the jurisdiction where the corporation is organized should control these 
legal issues.10 For example, legal problems relating to a corporation’s 
issuance of stock, rules governing shareholder voting, fiduciary duties of 
management, dissolution procedures, and the like are all resolved using the 
corporate law of the state of incorporation, even if another jurisdiction has a 
more significant relationship to the corporation or persons litigating the 
issues.11 
When a U.S. corporation conducts business outside of its incorporation 
jurisdiction, the corporation must comply with “foreign corporation” 
registration requirements (a process sometimes called “qualifying to do 
business”) in any state where the corporation establishes a sufficient 
jurisdictional presence.12 But registration as a foreign corporation does not 
change the internal affairs rule. In the qualifying state, as elsewhere, the 
foreign corporation’s internal governance matters are still controlled by the 
law of its state of incorporation.13 In fact, a corporation may incorporate in 
one jurisdiction in order to take advantage of its corporate law but conduct 
most (or all) of the corporation’s business elsewhere as a “pseudo-foreign” 
                                                                                                                                       
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971) (“The rights and liabilities 
of a corporation with respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can 
likewise be done by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law principles as are 
applicable to non-corporate parties.”); see also WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 91 (3d ed. 2002) (“[I]f the problem centers around 
corporate responsibility to others (a breach of contract claim, for example), then the normal or 
otherwise applicable choice-of-law rules govern.”). 
 9. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 
33, 44 (2006) (stating that “courts first began to articulate the doctrine in the 1860s”). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (providing that, except in unusual 
cases, “the local law of the state of incorporation” determines “[i]ssues involving the rights and 
liabilities of a corporation, other than those dealt with in § 301”). 
 11. See id. cmt. a. A few states decline to apply the internal affairs rule in certain cases. See 
infra note 14. 
 12. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 15.01 (1984) (requiring foreign corporations that 
“transact business” in the state to obtain a certificate of authority—a process often referred to as 
“qualifying to do business” in a state). 
 13. Id. § 15.05 (“This Act does not authorize this state to regulate the organization or internal 
affairs of a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state.”). 
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corporation—a corporation that is foreign where its principal place of 
business is located, but only because the corporation happens to be 
incorporated under a different state’s law.14 Many corporations chartered in 
Delaware fit this description. 
There are a number of justifications for the internal affairs rule, which 
now applies not only to corporations but also to other U.S. business 
associations that are formed under a particular state’s laws.15 The rule 
vindicates the choice-of-law preferences of those who organize the business 
and offers uniform legal treatment to its participants.16 As the Supreme 
Court has observed, application of a single body of law to internal 
governance questions provides “certainty and predictability of result” and 
protects “the justified expectations of parties with interests in [the business 
organization].”17 The internal affairs rule also reduces the possibility of 
inconsistent regulation of governance issues, and thus has constitutional 
dimensions.18 
Although there is strong policy support for the internal affairs rule, 
there are competing views about its merits, as discussed in more detail in 
the concluding section of this Article.19 There are also competing views 
about the “markets” for corporate law (to use law and economics 
terminology)20 and the corporate law convergence patterns that the internal 
affairs rule apparently produces. For example, scholars agree that the rule 
permits corporate managers to shop across jurisdictions for favorable 
corporate law, but there is disagreement about the precise dynamics and 
character of the resulting law markets.21 There is also debate about whether 
                                                                                                                                       
 14. A few states (e.g., California) have enacted statutes that purport to regulate certain 
corporate governance issues for foreign corporations whose business and stockholders have strong 
connections to the state. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2010) (providing that various 
parts of the California Corporations Code apply to a foreign corporation if more than fifty percent 
of its corporate income, property, and payroll factors are based in California and more than fifty 
percent of the corporation’s voting stock is owned by Californians, with exceptions for public 
corporations). Conflict of law scholars have noted that “[s]uch regulation raises questions 
concerning constitutional limitations on choice of law.” See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 
8, at 293 n.10.  
 15. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 901 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 254 (2008) (stating that the law 
of the state where the limited partnership is organized governs the partnership’s internal affairs). 
 16. See Tung, supra note 9, at 40 (stating that, for corporations, the internal affairs rule 
“vindicates corporate managers’ and shareholders’ choice of governing law” and “offers uniform 
treatment of all shareholders”). 
 17. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio, 462 U.S. 611, 621 (1983). 
 18. See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 8, §§ 97–99 (discussing various 
provisions in the Constitution that may limit the application of choice-of-law rules). 
 19. See infra notes 224–235 and accompanying text. 
 20. See supra note 3 (explaining the market for corporate law theory). 
 21. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1 (2009) (arguing that jurisdictional competition in American corporate law should be 
characterized as a triangular contest running on two sides between Delaware and all other states, 
and on the third side between Delaware and the U.S. government, which makes corporate law for 
public companies through securities regulation). 
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the competition that occurs in such markets is beneficial. The most famous 
dispute, now forty years old, ran between the late Professor William Cary 
and Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr. Cary contended that the internal affairs rule 
fuels a competitive race to the bottom that pressures states to forgo 
desirable corporate governance regulation, whereas Winter described a race 
to the top that forces states to enact corporate laws that maximize 
shareholder value.22 
One thing is clear: the content of corporate laws has converged across 
the United States. Most states’ corporation laws are now substantially 
similar in substance, if not style, to the Delaware General Corporation Law 
or the ABA’s Model Business Corporation Act.23 Law and economics 
scholars like Professor Roberta Romano contend that this corporate law 
convergence is a byproduct of the internal affairs rule and resulting state 
law competition, and that such competition produces the most efficient and 
desirable levels of corporate regulation.24 Other scholars make similar 
claims about global corporate law convergence patterns. Professor Franklin 
Gevurtz has summarized these arguments as follows: 
Corporations are in constant competition with each other and, in a global 
economy, this means competition with corporations from other countries. 
Corporations operating with less efficient corporate laws and structures 
will be at a disadvantage in this competition. 
. . . . 
[C]apital will gravitate toward companies organized under more efficient 
laws and institutions. This means that more new, or more vibrant and 
growing companies will be formed under efficient laws and institutions, 
gradually replacing or rendering less relevant the aging or smaller 
companies that were formed under less efficient laws and institutions. 
Also, the greater tax base provided by companies formed under more 
efficient laws and institutions will lead governments to change less 
                                                                                                                                       
 22. See Cary, supra note 4; Winter, supra note 4; see also Curtis Alva, Delaware and the 
Market for Corporate Charters, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 890–95 (1990) (describing the 
competing views of Professors William L. Cary, Roberta Romano, and Jonathan R. Macey and 
Geoffrey P. Miller). 
 23. As noted in the text, the Delaware General Corporation Law has long had a major 
influence on U.S. corporation law. The Model Business Corporation Act has also had a significant 
impact. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2:5 (3d ed. 2010) 
(noting that “the Model Act was intended not to become a uniform corporation law but rather to 
serve as a drafting guide for the states” and that “[e]ventually, the Model Act became the pattern 
for large parts of the corporation statutes in most states”). A recent article has used the phrase 
“constructive symbiosis” to describe the process of drafting and amending both the Model 
Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law over a period of many 
decades. See Jeffrey M. Gorris et al., Delaware Corporate Law and the Model Business 
Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (2011). 
 24. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 147 (1993) (“The 
genius of American corporate law . . . is that the dynamics of state competition reduces the 
number of extraneous regulations that must be bypassed.”). 
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efficient laws and institutions. Along similar lines, the greater interests of 
those who profit more from corporations operating under efficient laws 
and institutions will eventually place more pressure on governments to 
adopt such laws and institutions than the pressure governments feel from 
those who profit, but less in the aggregate, from inefficient laws and 
institutions.25 
Perhaps the strongest claim, made more than a decade ago by Professors 
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, is that the “end of history” for 
corporate law will be marked by global convergence of corporate 
governance systems around a single, standard shareholder-centered model 
of the corporation that is more efficient and cost-effective than competing 
state- or stakeholder-oriented models of the corporation.26 
B. THE REAL SEAT DOCTRINE 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, several key jurisdictions in 
continental Europe departed from the “state of incorporation” theory, as the 
internal affairs rule is known there, and began to follow instead what is now 
called the “real seat” doctrine.27 Under this choice-of-law rule, sometimes 
called siege réel or siege social in France or sitztheorie in Germany, a 
company must be organized under the laws of the country where its real 
seat—its administrative or management headquarters—is located.28 As one 
writer explains,  
the main philosophy behind [the real seat doctrine] is that a company must 
be subject to the law of the state in which its corporate centre of gravity is 
located. This is because it is assumed that the majority of the corporate 
stakeholders will be located there. Such stakeholders include shareholders, 
creditors, employees, and suppliers. It is also assumed that societal 
interests are best served when a company is subject to the law of the state 
where its central administration is located.29 
                                                                                                                                       
 25. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-
Ending Story?, 86 WASH. L. REV. 475, 494–95 & nn.109–15 (2011). As discussed below, (see 
text accompanying notes 185–188), Professor Gevurtz does not necessarily subscribe to the views 
of the scholars whose work he summarizes in the quoted textual material. 
 26. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439 (2001). The authors cite the corporate laws of postwar France and Japan as examples of 
state-oriented corporate laws where the government “play[ed] a strong direct role in the affairs of 
large business firms.” Id. at 446–47. They cite Germany’s corporate laws, which provide for labor 
representation on the boards of some companies, as a variant of stakeholder-oriented corporate 
law. Id. at 445–46, 449.  
 27. See generally Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 66 YALE L.J. 137, 166–70 
(1955) (describing the real seat doctrine as a response by France and Belgium to the loss of 
chartering business to England, which functioned as the Delaware of Europe in the second half of 
the nineteenth century). 
 28. See Ebke, supra note 2, at 1015–17.  
 29. Birkmose, supra note 5, at 67–68.  
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The real seat doctrine is enforced in several ways. First, a company 
organized in a country other than that of its real seat is not recognized as a 
legal entity in the real seat jurisdiction. Non-recognition disables the 
company from using the courts of the real seat jurisdiction to assert or 
protect its legal rights; it also puts the company’s owners at risk of personal 
liability there as de facto partners.30 In addition, if a company is initially 
organized where its real seat is located but tries to relocate the company 
seat to another jurisdiction without also reincorporating there, the country in 
which the company was originally organized might treat the transfer of the 
real seat as an involuntary dissolution/liquidation of the company, 
triggering potentially adverse tax consequences.31 
So long as the real seat doctrine prevailed in continental Europe,32 there 
was little prospect for regulatory competition or convergence in the field of 
European company law.33 This situation persisted even after the advent of 
the European Union and the promulgation of several company law 
“harmonization” directives that required Member States to conform 
portions of their company law to EU standards.34 The directives did not 
                                                                                                                                       
 30. See id. at 69–71 (explaining the various consequences that could follow for a company that 
organizes and operates across borders without regard to the real seat doctrine). 
 31. Id. at 70; see also Benjamin Angelette, Note, The Revolution That Never Came and the 
Revolution Coming—De Lasteyrie Du Salliant, Marks & Spencer, Sevic Systems and the 
Changing Corporate Laws in Europe, 92 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (2006). 
 32. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 479 n.9 (listing Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain as countries that apply some form of the real seat 
doctrine, and Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as 
countries following the incorporation theory); see also Ebke, supra note 2, at 1016 (stating that the 
real seat doctrine “is applied in one form or another by the majority of the Member States of the 
[European Union]”); Nicole Rothe, Comment, Freedom of Establishment of Legal Persons Within 
the European Union: An Analysis of the European Court of Justice Decision in the Überseering 
Case, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2004) (“Germany, France, Italy, and Spain[] adhere to the 
real seat doctrine, while the Netherlands, Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark follow the 
incorporation theory.”). 
 33. See supra note 5; see also Carney, supra note 4, at 317–18 (describing European company 
law as follows: “The evidence . . . is consistent with the development of interest group bargains 
prior to the elimination of trade barriers . . . .”); Didier Martin & Forrest G. Alogna, A European 
Delaware: The Nascent Regulatory Market in Europe, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT 
FINANCIER, Dec. 2007, at 4, 4–5 (“In continental Europe, the real seat . . . doctrine has historically 
been a strong barrier to a European market for corporate charters.”). 
 34. EU lawmakers have attempted to harmonize key aspects of Member States’ company law 
(and other laws of Member States) through mandatory EU directives that are to be implemented 
through national law reforms. See Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Community 
Experience for Developing Regional Organizations, 11 DICK. J. INT’L L. 485, 536–37 (1993) 
(explaining process of harmonization). But as one paper explains, in the field of company law the 
harmonization process has “reinforced the non-competition equilibrium among the [M]ember 
[S]tates.” William W. Bratton et al., How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking: A 
Comparative Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 353 (2009); see also Luca Enriques, EC Company 
Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 8 (2006) 
(arguing that the European Union’s corporate law harmonization program has had little impact on 
core aspects of European corporations’ governance and management). 
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preempt Member States’ ability to regulate company board structure,35 or to 
protect employee interests through company law co-determination 
requirements—a mandate that labor interests be represented in the 
management of large companies36—or to include gender equity standards in 
company law.37 Nor did the directives prevent Member States from 
imposing minimum capital requirements that exceeded those provided in 
the directives38 or their own “wrongful trading” liability standards on 
directors who failed to declare their company insolvent in a timely 
fashion.39 Some EU Member States, notably the United Kingdom, had 
relatively relaxed standards on one or more of these issues or refused to 
impose such requirements on companies organized there.40 However, the 
real seat doctrine prevented European businesses from taking advantage of 
more flexible foreign company laws and effectively insulated other EU 
Member States from competition in the field of company law, whether from 
the United Kingdom or elsewhere.41 
C.  ECJ DECISIONS LIMITING THE REAL SEAT DOCTRINE AND EU 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS EXPANDING COMPANY MOBILITY 
Starting in 1999, a series of European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions 
began to curb application of the real seat doctrine pursuant to EU Treaty 
articles 43 and 48. These “freedom of establishment” provisions of the 
Treaty prohibit Member States from imposing “restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment of nationals of [other] Member State[s]” in their territory, 
                                                                                                                                       
 35. Uwe Blaurock, Steps Toward a Uniform Corporate Law in the European Union, 31 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 377, 389 (1998) (“Within the European Union, there are various models for 
the administration of stock corporations.”). 
 36. See Jens C. Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice of Law, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 51, 89 n.165 (2005) (“Several Member States, including Germany, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden, have adopted statutes that govern 
codetermination for employees on supervisory and management boards.”). 
 37. See JUSTIN BORG-BARTHET, THE GOVERNING LAW OF COMPANIES IN EU LAW 69 (2011) 
(noting that “a number of European states have adopted laws to bring about equal representation 
of each gender in the boards of certain companies”). 
 38. See Luca Enriques & Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case 
Against the European Legal Capital Rules, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2001) (noting that 
“many Member States go beyond the Second Directive’s legal capital rules, providing for a 
stricter regime intended to better protect creditors”). 
 39. See Gabriele Apfelbacher, The German Corporate Governance Code, PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, at 591 (2002) 
(noting that “the details [of European wrongful trading laws] vary considerably”). 
 40. See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation Versus Regulatory 
Competition 21 (Inst. for Law & Fin., Working Paper No. 41, 2005), available at http://www.ilf-
frankfurt.de/uploads/media/ILF_WP_041.pdf (“[D]espite the early harmonisation efforts, many 
feel that the UK’s company law still has a substantially more flexible character than the company 
laws of many other European jurisdictions.”). 
 41. See Carney, supra note 4, at 318 (describing post-EU company law in Member States as 
characterized by “effective interest group resistance to competitive forces once a common market 
was created”). 
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including “the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries.”42 The right 
of freedom of establishment extends not only to natural persons, but also to 
“[c]ompanies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member 
State and having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the [European Union].”43 Three ECJ cases 
applying these Treaty provisions in the field of company law are 
particularly noteworthy. 
A 1999 decision, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen,44 was 
the opening salvo. The ECJ held that Danish citizens who organized a U.K. 
company for the sole purpose of doing all of its business in Denmark, and 
who chose the U.K. entity in order to evade Denmark’s minimum capital 
requirements for domestic companies, were nonetheless entitled to register 
the U.K. company to do business in Denmark.45 Denmark’s refusal to 
register the company, the ECJ held, violated the company’s right to 
freedom of establishment under the Treaty.46 Denmark had defended its 
refusal on public interest grounds—protection of creditors—but the ECJ 
held that other means less burdensome to fundamental EU Treaty freedoms, 
like disclosure in Denmark of the company’s status as a U.K. entity, were 
available for that purpose.47 
                                                                                                                                       
 42. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 
O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002), ch. 2, art. 43. Article 43 EC provides: 
 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be 
prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, 




 43. Article 48 EC extends the freedom of establishment to business entities: 
 
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community 
shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are 
nationals of Member States. 
 
Id. art. 48. 
 44. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
 45. Id. para. 39. 
 46. Id. para. 30.  
 47. The court concluded that Denmark’s refusal of company registration in order to protect its 
minimum capital standards did not satisfy the four conditions necessary for national measures that 
hinder the exercise of fundamental Treaty freedoms. As noted by the court, according to the 
standards laid down in its Cassis de Dijon decision, such measures “must be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.” Id. para. 34.  
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The next landmark decision, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction 
Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC),48 came in 2002. Überseering was a 
Dutch company that had been acquired by German nationals who moved its 
headquarters to Düsseldorf.49 Thereafter, Überseering brought suit in 
Germany against Nordic, a German company, as a result of a construction 
dispute. The German court concluded that Überseering had no capacity to 
sue in Germany because the company’s real seat had been transferred there 
when German nationals acquired ownership of its shares and relocated the 
company’s central administration to Düsseldorf.50 The real seat doctrine 
required reincorporation of Überseering in Germany at that point, but the 
company had not done so.51 The ECJ disagreed, holding that the German 
court was wrong to refuse Überseering access to German courts because 
Treaty articles 43 and 48 required Germany to recognize both Überseering’s 
legal capacity as a Dutch company (despite the relocation of the company’s 
real seat to Germany) and the company’s right to sue in Germany.52 
The ECJ further enhanced EU companies’ freedom of establishment 
rights in Kamer Van Koophandel en Fabrieken Voor Amersterdam v. 
Inspire Art Ltd.,53 a 2003 case testing whether the Netherlands could 
impose special requirements on a U.K. company organized by Dutch 
nationals for the purpose of doing business in the Netherlands. Dutch 
corporate law recognized the right of such a pseudo-foreign company to 
conduct business there but conditioned that right on the company’s 
compliance with certain requirements of Dutch company law (e.g., 
provisions regarding share capital) that were intended to protect creditors.54 
The ECJ held that the Netherlands could not so condition recognition of the 
foreign company without infringing the EU Treaty’s freedom of 
establishment principles.55 
Scholars now agree that the ECJ’s expansive interpretation of business 
entities’ rights to freedom of establishment under the EU Treaty in Centros, 
Überseering, and Inspire Art has considerably diminished the impact of the 
real seat doctrine in the European Union, especially for newly formed 
companies.56 As one writer puts it, “The net effect [of the three decisions] is 
                                                                                                                                       
 48. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), 
2002 E.C.R. I-9919. 
 49. Id. para. 7. 
 50. Id. paras. 9–10. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. para. 94.  
 53. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amersterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-10155. 
 54. Id. paras. 22–33. 
 55. Id. paras. 97–98, 101. As in both Centros and Überseering, the ECJ rejected arguments in 
Inspire Art that interference with freedom of establishment was justified to protect the public 
interest. Id.  
 56. See, e.g., Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 374 (“The ECJ decisions in Centros, Überseering 
and Inspire Art make it possible for new [EU] firms to migrate to more favorable jurisdictions.”); 
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the importation of the American internal affairs doctrine which requires that 
the only state which is entitled to regulate the organisation of companies is 
the state under whose laws the company is incorporated.”57 
Concurrently with these EU case law developments, changes in other 
EU laws created additional possibilities for existing companies to 
reorganize or move across Member State lines.58 These new EU rules 
include a cross-border merger directive that forbids EU Member States 
from restricting merger transactions to domestic entities.59 EU legislation 
also now authorizes creation of a “Societas Europea,” a business entity that 
combines companies from two different Member States into a new 
company governed primarily by only one of those States’ company laws.60 
In addition, the ECJ’s 2012 VALE ruling61 will facilitate company 
conversions from the governing law of one Member State to another. 
A few important limitations on freedom of establishment still linger. 
For example, EU regulatory changes designed to establish a supranational 
EU incorporation option for small firms—the European Private Company—
have not yet borne fruit.62 In addition, the ECJ’s ruling in Cartesio Oktato 
es Szolgaltato bt63 suggests that barriers may remain for existing companies 
that want to relocate to a new EU jurisdiction. Cartesio permits an EU 
Member State to condition the continued existence of a company formed 
under its laws on the company’s maintenance of a real seat in the 
jurisdiction.64 Because a company must legally exist in order to invoke its 
                                                                                                                                       
Angelette, supra note 31, at 1221 (“The Court’s interpretation of Articles 43 and 48 of the EC 
Treaty threatens to make the place of central administration wholly irrelevant for corporate law 
purposes.”); Armour, supra note 40, at 13 (“Essentially, the Court ruled that as a matter of EC 
law, a company, once validly formed under the laws of any Member State, becomes a ‘person’ 
and is consequently entitled to exercise the Treaty Freedoms.”); Birkmose, supra note 5, at 106 
(“There is no doubt that the ECJ has radically changed the corporate landscape in the last five 
years.”); see also Christoph Allmendinger, Company Law in the European Union and the United 
States: A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of the EU Freedoms of Establishment and Capital 
and the U.S. Interstate Commerce Clause, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 67, 103 (2013) (stating 
that “it has to be concluded that the ECJ’s interpretation of the Freedoms of Establishment and 
Capital limits the powers to regulate company law at the state level more severely than does the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause”). 
 57. BORG-BARTHET, supra note 37, at 122.  
 58. See Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 358–66 (discussing both the EU’s Cross-Border 
Merger Directive and the SE Regulation). 
 59. Council Directive 2005/56/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1. 
 60. Commission Regulation 2157/201, para. 7, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1 (EC). 
 61. Case C-378/10, VALE Epitesi kft, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000 (holding that there is an 
impermissible restriction on freedom of establishment under EC Treaty Articles 49 and 54 when 
national legislation of a Member State allows a domestic company to convert into another 
domestic business entity but does not allow a company organized under another Member State’s 
law to so convert); see also Justin Borg-Barthet, Free at Last? Choice of Corporate Law in the EU 
Following the Judgment in VALE, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 503 (2013). 
 62. See Jaap Barneveld, Will the European Private Company See Daylight After All?, Post No. 
40, DEFINING TENSION (May 30, 2011) (on file with author). 
 63. Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-09641. 
 64. Id. para. 124. 
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rights to free establishment under the EU Treaty, this qualification on exit 
rights may limit some existing companies’ ability to relocate unless they 
reorganize as a new company in the destination Member State.65 Finally, 
whether or not obstacles to relocation exist under Cartesio, tax laws may 
yet impede cross-border relocations in the European Union.66 
II. COMPETING PREDICTIONS AND EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
THE EFFECT OF THE DEMISE OF THE REAL SEAT 
DOCTRINE AND RELATED EU DEVELOPMENTS 
This Part of the Article describes the predictions of commentators about 
whether the ECJ decisions and other EU changes described in Part I would 
prompt Member States to compete in the field of company law. This Part 
also describes the latest evidence on jurisdictional competition. The 
evidence shows that, to date, there has been scant competition and only 
limited change and convergence in European company law. In short, there 
is no apparent Delaware effect in Europe.67 
A.  COMPETING PREDICTIONS 
The ECJ decisions and other EU changes described in Part I naturally 
prompted predictions that Member States would or should modify their 
company laws to compete with other jurisdictions for company 
formations.68 For example, Professor (then-graduate student) Jens Damman 
posited that to the extent the European Union embraced a free choice model 
for incorporations, companies would likely migrate towards those states 
that offer the “most efficient corporate law” (i.e., more permissive or lax 
regulatory schemes) and that “Member States—under pressure from local 
attorneys not to remain passive in the charter market—will probably engage 
in a race for quality, competing with each other more vigorously than their 
                                                                                                                                       
 65. According to one recent analysis, the impact of Cartesio on exit rights depends on whether 
or not the company is exiting from or migrating to a real seat state, or from or to an incorporation 
theory state. See Carsten Gerner-Beuerle & Michael Schillig, The Mysteries of Freedom of 
Establishment After Cartesio, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 303 (2010). 
 66. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 40, at 381 (noting that many EU member states impose “exit 
taxes on companies which seek to relocate”); Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 371 (“Reorganizing 
under a foreign corporate law statute often triggers taxes . . . .”). 
 67. For one discussion of the “Delaware effect,” see Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P. M. 
Vermeulen, Does the European Company Law Prevent the ‘Delaware Effect’?, 11 EUR. L.J. 785, 
789–91 (2005). 
 68. See, e.g., Birkmose, supra note 5, at 108 (“[T]here is no doubt that the ECJ has started a 
process that might eventually lead to the creation of a market for company incorporations.”); 
Carsten Frost, Transfer of Company’s Seat—An Unfolding Story in Europe, 36 VICT. U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 359, 387 (2005) (“As a result of the ECJ decisions, the pressure on national 
legislators in the EU Member States has increased to make their corporate laws more attractive to 
investors.”); Martin & Alogna, supra note 33 (arguing that France should enact corporate law 
reforms to attract EU businesses). 
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U.S. counterparts.”69 Many believed that the resulting competition would 
trigger company law convergence across the European Union and, perhaps, 
the emergence of a Delaware of Europe.70 
Some commentators disagreed that an American-style race to the 
bottom (or to the top, depending on one’s perspective) would occur in 
Europe.71 Those in the latter group identified a number of disincentives, 
summarized below, that might impede jurisdictional competition for 
company formations within the European Union and/or convergence of 
European company law. 
1. Disincentives for Member State Company Law Competition 
Several commentators cited Member State financial considerations as a 
factor that might limit competition. For example, because EU law prevents 
a Member State from collecting franchise taxes from a company whose 
only connection to the Member State is that it was organized there, many 
argued that chartering fees and taxes would not be a great incentive for 
European jurisdictions to compete for company formations.72 Others 
pointed out that if an EU Member State wanted to compete effectively in 
the field of company law, the jurisdiction would have to develop not only 
superior substantive company law, but also a corresponding system of 
judicial expertise in the field—a difficult and expensive proposition.73 
                                                                                                                                       
 69. Dammann, supra note 5, at 543.  
 70. See, e.g., Angelette, supra note 31, at 1223 (noting, among other possible scenarios, that 
inter-jurisdictional competition for incorporations might result in a race of laxity in EU corporate 
law); Dammann, supra note 5 at 530 (“European corporations faced with the prospect of free 
choice are likely to reincorporate in one or a few Member States, and it is highly probable that one 
or more of the smaller Member States will emerge as the leading jurisdiction(s).”); Laura 
Jankolovits, Note, No Borders. No Boundaries. No Limits: An Analysis of Corporate Law in the 
European Union after the Centros Decision, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 973, 1004 (2004) 
(“[T]he holding in Centros may create a race for the bottom in Europe.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law 
Harmonization in the European Union, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 939, 947 & nn.25–27 (2006) 
(arguing that “no Member State is likely to enter the market for incorporations” and listing other 
authorities who concurred). As indicated in the text parenthetical, scholars disagree whether 
jurisdictional competition in the field of American corporate law is beneficial. Compare Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers 
from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 (1999) (arguing that state competition likely does not 
maximize shareholder wealth), with ROMANO, supra note 24, at 14–24 (arguing that state 
competition benefits shareholders). See also Dammann, supra note 36, at 53 & nn.4–5 (collecting 
authorities on both sides). 
 72. See, e.g., Birkmose, supra note 5, at 107 (stating under EU rules, “taxation seems unlikely 
to be an incentive to compete for company incorporations”); Frost, supra note 68, at 379–80 
(stating that “Member States do not earn significant amounts of money from incorporating 
businesses”); but see Dammann, supra note 5, at 525 (offering reasons that “the European market 
for corporate charters [might] not be substantially less lucrative than the U.S. market”). 
 73. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 532 (“Any state—large or small—interested in establishing 
itself as an attractive destination for firms looking to reincorporate must make a substantial 
investment in its legal and judicial services.”). 
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2. Disincentives for EU Businesses to Use Foreign Company 
Laws 
There were also disincentives for European businesses that might want 
to use another Member State’s company law. One disincentive was 
uncertainty about the very existence and scope of the new EU internal 
affairs rule. While there is now general agreement that the EU Treaty 
requires Member States to apply the internal affairs rule to companies 
organized in other European countries, when Centros and its progeny first 
emerged, legal scholars did not agree on the extent to which those 
decisions, and the EU Treaty freedom of establishment provisions on which 
they were based, required Member States to abandon the real seat 
doctrine.74 
Another disincentive for using foreign company laws was uncertainty 
about their content and the mechanics of corporate mobility for existing 
firms, especially during the period before the European Union’s cross-
border merger directive was finalized in 2005,75 but thereafter as well.76 For 
example, if an existing, large European company wants to reorganize as a 
public limited liability company regulated under EU law (Societas 
Europaea or SE) and change its governing national company law in the 
process, as Allianz did in 2006,77 many procedural obstacles exist.78 
Commentators also questioned whether the content of harmonized 
European company law was sufficiently different across jurisdictions to 
create incentives for forum shopping by new or existing business entities.79 
And, assuming an EU Member State’s company law was especially 
attractive to businesses from other countries, it was unclear whether those 
                                                                                                                                       
 74. See, e.g., Werner F. Ebke, Centros—Some Realities and Some Mysteries, 48 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 623, 624 (2000) (“Throughout the European Union, legal scholars and practitioners . . . are 
trying to comprehend and explain the Court’s holdings in the Centros case.”). Even today, 
uncertainty lingers across the European Union about the content of corporate choice-of-law rules, 
since neither Centros nor its progeny expressly dealt with conflicts of law rules as such. See Frost, 
supra note 68, at 369 (noting that “[t]he cases fail to deal expressly either with conflict of law 
rules, or with company law”). 
 75. Before this directive, discussed supra at notes 58–59 and accompanying text, took effect, 
the laws of some Member States authorized mergers only for domestic companies, thus precluding 
a cross-border merger—traditionally the easiest method for an existing company to seamlessly 
reincorporate under the company law of another jurisdiction. 
 76. See, e.g., Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 350 (stating that after the cross-border merger 
directive took effect, “[t]he door to [corporate] mobility ha[d] opened only in theory”). 
 77. Allianz SE - Societas Europaea, ALLIANZ, https://www.allianz.com/en/about_us 
/management/corporate_governance/legal-form.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2014). 
 78. See Martin & Alogna, supra note 33, at 7–8 (describing various approval requirements that 
a firm organized as a French Societe Anonime (S.A.) must satisfy to become an SE). 
 79. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, EC Company Law and the Fears of a European Delaware, 15 
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1259, 1269 (2004) (“Compared with the corporate law environment in the US 
when chartermongering began, not only are European company laws much more flexible than 
those of most US states back then, but also some of their inflexible features . . . cannot be done 
away with by Member States, because they are imposed by EC law.”). 
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businesses would (or should) be concerned that ongoing compliance 
obligations in the formation jurisdiction might prove unduly burdensome in 
the long run.80 
Commentators also pointed to litigation obstacles that might be 
associated with corporate migration within Europe. For example, it was 
argued that the act of forming a company in one Member State and 
maintaining the company’s real seat in another might create a sufficient 
connection to the first jurisdiction so that the company could be compelled 
to litigate external affairs as well as internal affairs there—a potentially 
costly and inconvenient result for a company situated elsewhere.81 Such a 
company might also encounter difficulty if its internal affairs matters were 
litigated in its real seat Member State, where courts might be unfamiliar 
with the language or company law of the organizing jurisdiction.82 
3. Cultural and Political Disincentives 
Other commentators noted that cultural and political factors would 
make corporate migrations “less frictionless” in Europe than in the United 
States, and thus reduce the level of competition and convergence in the field 
of European company law. As summarized by one writer, “[l]anguage is the 
most obvious cultural factor, alongside more specific business culture 
matters. Firms are in fact embedded in their nation’s social context, which 
company law rules reflect. Given the EU’s lesser cultural uniformity, 
heterogeneous preferences may make alternative company law regimes 
unattractive.”83 Another similarly argued that, “[d]espite increasing 
economic ties, the Member States have maintained their individuality and 
nationalism” and that such nationalism might “keep businesses, especially 
private or smaller business, within the founding citizens’ personal 
jurisdiction.”84 Other commentators concurred in these assessments, noting 
that for smaller firms, “the vast majority of [which] . . . are still formed 
under local corporate law rules,” there was “inertia in terms of barriers of 
language, a lack of information regarding other systems and ignorance 
                                                                                                                                       
 80. See, e.g., Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 376–77 (describing ongoing compliance 
obligations for companies organized as a U.K. Limited Company). 
 81. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 492–97. In contrast, while a U.S. corporation is subject to 
general personal jurisdiction in its state of incorporation, defending litigation in a “foreign” state 
presents no serious concerns given that state legal systems, language, and culture are similar 
across the United States.  
 82. See Dammann, supra note 5, at 498.  
 83. Enriques, supra note 79, at 1265; accord Dammann, supra note 5, at 502 (stating that 
“language barriers may be of considerable importance to small firms who do business mostly in 
their real seat state,” but also acknowledging that this problem is unlikely to “deter larger 
corporations who do business in multiple Member States”). 
 84. Jankolovits, supra note 70, at 1004.  
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regarding alternatives, and the competitive advantages in some industries 
based on being incorporated locally.”85 
Finally, it was suggested that members of the legal profession in the 
various Member States would resist company law competition. Because 
local lawyers would lose business if entity clients organized or reorganized 
elsewhere, commentators argued, lawyers would be unlikely to recommend 
that their clients use other Member States’ company laws.86 
B. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO DATE 
As described below, the evidence to date largely bears out predictions 
that there would not be dramatic competition and convergence in the field 
of European company law. 
1.  Entity Choice Patterns 
Empirical scholarship shows that large firms in the European Union are 
not engaging in forum shopping, despite new possibilities for cross-border 
reincorporation of such businesses through mergers or the SE statute.87 A 
recent study by Professors Marco Becht, Colin Mayer, and Hannes Wagner 
found that no EU Member State incorporated “significant numbers” of 
public companies in the United Kingdom—a logical jurisdiction of choice 
because of its permissive company law.88 With respect to SEs, which are 
generally large firms, a study by Professors William Bratton, Joe 
McCahery, and Erik Vermeulen similarly concluded, “Corporate law forum 
shopping ha[d] not been a salient motivation for the 310 SEs” that had been 
formed as of 2009.89 
Both these groups of scholars, as well as others, have identified a slight 
trend over the past decade that favors the U.K. private company limited by 
shares (the U.K. Limited), at least for small, start-up firms, many of which 
are formed for businesses based in Germany or the Netherlands.90 It is 
assumed that these new firms have been attracted to the U.K. Limited’s 
lower start-up costs (low initial capital requirements) and the relatively 
                                                                                                                                       
 85. Martin & Alogna, supra note 33, at 9.  
 86. See, e.g., Enriques, supra note 79, at 1264 (arguing that home state counsel would be 
likely to oppose decisions by company law clients to organize or reorganize elsewhere). 
 87. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (describing these new options). 
 88. Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry, 14 
J. CORP. FIN. 241, 247 (2008). 
 89. Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 361. The number of new SEs continues to grow across the 
European Union. One recent data compilation reports the SE total as 2052, many of which are 
organized under the laws of Germany or the Czech Republic. See Anders Carlson et al., Overview 
of Current State of SE Founding in Europe, WORKER PARTICIPATION, 3 (Jan. 1, 2014), 
http://www.worker-participation.eu/content/download/5793/96801/file/SE-Facts&Figures-01-01-
2014.pdf. 
 90. See Armour, supra note 40, at 387 (reporting growing trend of German firms incorporating 
in the United Kingdom); Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 374–80; see generally Becht et al., supra 
note 88. 
334 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
short time frame (days rather than weeks) in which a U.K. Limited can be 
established.91 
The trend favoring the U.K. Limited appears to have slowed in recent 
years, however, as start-up firms fail or encounter difficulties with ongoing 
U.K. reporting requirements.92 Moreover, the volume of firms taking 
advantage of the U.K. Limited option has been characterized as “rather 
trivial . . . , both as an economic proposition and as a lawmaking 
motivation.”93 In short, after considering the results of a prior study, as well 
as their own research into EU entity choice patterns, Bratton and his co-
authors conclude: “Mobility is still largely constrained by member state 
regulation.”94 
2.  Convergence 
Scholars have found some evidence that EU Member States with 
restrictive corporate laws are responding to competitive pressures in the 
post-Centros era, particularly as regards costs of formation.95 Examples 
include recent company law changes in France reducing the capital required 
to form a limited liability company—known there as a société par actions 
simplifiée (SAS)—to one Euro.96 Germany has also enacted company law 
reforms, known by the acronym MoMiG, in response to what one 
commentator calls “The ‘Invasion’ of the British Ltd.”97 These changes 
relax the requirements of Germany’s limited liability company law—the 
law applicable to a Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH)—to, 
among other things, reduce minimum capital requirements and speed up 
registration processes.98 The Netherlands has also enacted reforms that 
                                                                                                                                       
 91. Becht et al., supra note 88, at 250 (“[The data show that] what does matter for corporate 
mobility are the large differences regarding minimum capital requirements and setup costs.”); 
Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 376 (“European firms incorporating in the United Kingdom are 
mostly ‘round-trippers’ looking for rock bottom cost and speed.”). Web ads like those on the U.K. 
Companies House website show how simple the process is. Web Incorporation Service, 
COMPANIES HOUSE, https://ewf.companieshouse.gov.uk//runpage?page=welcome (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2014). 
 92. Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 376 (characterizing the survival rate of foreign private 
limited companies as “extraordinarily low”). 
 93. Id. at 352.  
 94. Id. at 385.  
 95. See, e.g., Becht et al., supra note 88, § 4.4; Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 380–84. 
 96. This development is reported by Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 379. For a more detailed 
summary of recent changes to French company law, see Martin & Alogna, supra note 33, at 16 
nn.123–24. 
 97. Gregor Bachmann, Introductory Editorial: Renovating the German Private Limited 
Company—Special Issue on the Reform of the GmbH, 9 GER. L.J. 1063, 1066 (2008). 
 98. See Michael Beurskens & Ulrich Noack, The Reform of German Private Limited 
Company: Is the GmbH Ready for the 21st Century?, 9 GER. L.J. 1069, 1071 (2008). 
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reduce initial capital requirements for small businesses and permit 
shareholders to contract for special corporate governance rules.99 
These changes do not reflect a dramatic level of corporate law 
convergence across the European Union. One set of scholars recently 
concluded: “The scope of [recent corporate law] reforms [in the European 
Union] remains narrow because the competitive pressure is largely limited 
to economically-negligible small entrepreneurs, who mostly aim to 
minimize the out of pocket costs of incorporation.”100 Other scholars have 
assessed the EU environment as having the potential for competition and 
convergence in the field of company law, a state of affairs that does not yet 
fully exist.101 
C. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE FROM EU BUSINESS LAWYERS AND 
EXPERTS 
During the summer of 2009, the author discussed these EU 
developments with attorneys and legal scholars from France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in series of in-person interviews.102 
The goal of meeting with these various experts, all active in the field of 
European business association law, was to gauge their attitudes and 
understanding about the use of foreign business entity forms in the 
European Union. The author wanted to ascertain, among other things, 
whether those operating at ground level perceived that recent EU 
developments had changed the business entity landscape for lawyers and 
clients in day-to-day practice. In short, had the new EU internal affairs rule 
taken root with company law practitioners in Europe? The author’s most 
important findings are summarized below. 
1. Use of Foreign Business Entities: Reputational Concerns 
All of the lawyers the author interviewed outside the United 
Kingdom—French, German, and Dutch—were familiar with the U.K. 
Limited entity option. Yet none of the interviewees had used that form to 
                                                                                                                                       
 99. See Tom van Duuren et al., Reform Private Company Law (Flex BV) Effective from 1 
October 2012, CLIFFORD CHANCE (July 10, 2012), http://www.cliffordchance.com 
/publicationviews/publications/2012/06/reform_private_companylawflexbveffectiv.html. 
 100. Bratton et al., supra note 34, at 385.  
 101. See generally Karolina Carlsson, A Possible European Delaware—Can the European 
Private Company Prevent It? (2006) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Jönköping University), 
available at http://hj.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:4090/FULLTEXT01.pdf.  
 102. Interviewees included attorneys at a law firm in Paris who specialized in transactional law, 
as well as French legal academics. The author also interviewed transactional lawyers from a large, 
multinational law firm in Frankfurt, as well as German corporate law scholars. In the Netherlands, 
the author again interviewed transactional lawyers from a large, multinational law firm, as well as 
a Dutch law professor who was also an active corporate practitioner. In the United Kingdom, the 
author spoke with the Dean of the Oxford University Business School. 
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organize a client’s domestic business. The reasons varied, but one theme 
that emerged was that of reputation. 
For example, lawyers from a large multinational law firm in Frankfurt 
reported having read legal publications that reported trends favoring use of 
U.K. Limiteds.103 One of these attorneys was familiar with what he called a 
“how-to/cookbook” publication on the formation of a U.K. Limited.104 But 
these same lawyers did not use the U.K. Limited form for their clients and 
stated confidently that sophisticated, wealthy clients in Germany “would 
not use” that option.105 Indeed, these lawyers expressed the opinion that 
German lenders would “require” use of a GmbH rather than deal with a 
foreign entity, in part because of familiarity with creditor rights associated 
with the GmbH form.106 
Similarly, the French lawyers who were interviewed—specialists in 
transactional law—reported that they did not form foreign entities for their 
clients who conducted domestic businesses, and preferred instead to use the 
French SAS or SARL.107 Like the German lawyers, the French lawyers 
were also concerned about reputation. The lawyers noted, as an example, 
that one of their clients (one not initially organized by them) was a U.K. 
Limited that conducted business as a pseudo-foreign entity in France. They 
reported that this company encountered operational difficulties within 
France. For instance, the company’s landlord was “leery” of extending 
credit to it and required additional guarantees as a condition of doing 
business.108 
Business lawyers in the Netherlands also agreed that Centros and its 
progeny had not produced much movement of corporations within the 
European Union generally or within the Netherlands in particular, save 
possibly for some small firms.109 In the view of the lawyers interviewed at 
the Amsterdam offices of a multinational law firm, which included a notary 
who specialized in corporate law, it would be “odd” for a Dutch business to 
organize as a U.K. Limited, and such a move might “signal a problem” to 
                                                                                                                                       
 103. Interview with Attorneys, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, in Frankfurt, Ger. (June 
30, 2009) [hereinafter Freshfields Interview]. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Interview with Lawyers, Didier & Lévy, in Paris, Fr. (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Didier 
Interview]. The lawyers did acknowledge that in certain circumstances, tax law considerations 
might dictate a foreign incorporation, giving as an example a French investment company 
organized in Luxembourg. The acronym “SARL” used in the text stands for Société Anonyme a 
Responsabilité Limitée, a form of limited liability company. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Interview with Lawyers, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP, in Amsterdam, Neth. (July 6, 2009) 
[hereinafter Norton Interview]. The author also conducted an extensive interview with Erik 
Vermeulen, a Professor of Law at Tilburg University who serves as Vice President of Philips 
International B.V. (Corporate and Financial Law) and has written about choice of law in the 
European Union in the wake of Centros. See supra notes 34 and 67. 
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outsiders, or at least be perceived to do so unless tax reasons justified a 
different jurisdictional choice.110 In fact, these lawyers reported seeing 
examples where lenders used covenants in loan documents to guard against 
any change of jurisdiction by the borrower.111 
The Dutch lawyers’ concerns about the reputation of U.K. Limiteds 
may be justified, at least based on recent press reports that post-date the 
interviews. As summarized in a recent post on The Defining Tension, dated 
May 30, 2011, “the [U.K. Limited] has got a bad reputation over the last 
years among bankruptcy trustees. [A leading Dutch financial] newspaper 
researched the files of 123 [U.K. Limiteds] that went bankrupt in the 
Netherlands. In 79 [of these companies], the bankruptcy trustees reported 
mismanagement; in 23 cases, fraud was reported.”112 The poster concludes: 
“The [U.K. Limited] seems to attract entrepreneurs who have gone bankrupt 
before.”113 
2. Use of Foreign Business Entities: Concerns About 
Compliance Obligations 
As some commentators had surmised,114 interviewees expressed 
concerns about reporting requirements that a foreign entity like the U.K. 
Limited might entail. For example, German lawyers cited ongoing annual 
filing obligations associated with the U.K. Limited as a potential obstacle to 
use of that entity in Germany. The lawyers were concerned not only about 
the work that such filings would entail for their clients, but also about 
additional expenses from service companies that might be enlisted to assist 
with completion and filing.115 These concerns may also be well-founded; 
recent press reports suggest that large numbers of German firms that have 
used the U.K. Limited form are, in fact, failing to comply with U.K. 
reporting requirements.116 
The French lawyers were similarly concerned about ongoing filing 
requirements for U.K. Limited doing business in France. They noted that in 
addition to complying with the U.K. rules, such a firm would also have to 
                                                                                                                                       
 110. Norton Interview, supra note 109. 
 111. Id.  
 112. See Matthijs J. de Jongh, Abuse of British Ltd’s in the Netherlands, Post No. 28, DEFINING 
TENSION (Feb. 27, 2011) (on file with author). 
 113. Id.  
 114. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 115. Freshfields Interview, supra note 103. The German lawyers also expressed concerns that if 
a U.K. Limited did not properly file the necessary U.K. reports—a task that might be difficult for 
German owners—veil-piercing theories might put the company’s owners at risk. Id.  
 116. Hugh Williamson, Germans Break UK Limited Company Rules, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2006), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/00877330-5345-11db-99c5-0000779e2340.html#axzz2VvL8E4QU 
(“Between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of the estimated 30,000 limited companies in Germany are 
failing to file financial results and other data to Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry, 
according to industry insiders and a recent survey.”). 
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satisfy special requirements of French law relating to reporting of financial 
statements.117 
3. Changes in Domestic Company Law 
Despite predictions by some scholars that the United Kingdom was 
likely to emerge as a company law jurisdiction of choice,118 none of the 
lawyers or other experts the author interviewed believed that a Delaware of 
Europe had emerged or was likely to do so in the near future. Among the 
reasons cited by interviewees were recent reforms of domestic company 
laws that add flexibility to entity formation processes. Indeed, interviewees 
in France, Germany, and the Netherlands were all quite eager to discuss 
recent or proposed changes to their respective countries’ company laws. As 
explained below, the prevailing perception was that these changes were 
responsive to Centros and related EU developments that made it possible 
for domestic businesses to organize in other EU countries. However, 
interviewees did not perceive that any one Member State had emerged as a 
model or was making a concerted attempt to attract foreign incorporations. 
Instead, they characterized ongoing company law reforms as designed to 
keep domestic companies chartered at home. 
For example, the French lawyers extolled the virtues of the French SAS 
as a flexible business entity form with no minimum capital requirements.119 
They credited the efforts of France’s Senator Phillipe Marini, as well as a 
company law organization known as ANSA, as catalysts for French 
company law reforms.120 Although not directly related to company law, the 
French lawyers also called attention to France’s new “Auto-Entrepreneur” 
law as an example of changes in France designed to make it easier for small 
businesses and individual entrepreneurs to conduct business there.121 
As is explained in more detail in other sources, Germany’s “MoMiG” 
reforms, passed in 2008, relax various requirements associated with use of 
the GmbH, including minimum capital requirements.122 Interviewees stated 
that these changes were designed to encourage German businesses to 
organize under German law rather than to attract foreign investors to the 
                                                                                                                                       
 117. Didier Interview, supra note 107. 
 118. See Armour, supra note 40, at 393–95 (arguing that the United Kingdom has incentives to 
compete in the field of company law). 
 119. Didier Interview, supra note 107. 
 120. “ANSA” stands for Association Nationale des Sociétés par Actions (National Association 
of Stock Companies). 
 121. See generally Nadine Levratto & Evelyne Serverin, Become Independent! The Paradoxical 
Constraints of France’s “Auto-Entrepreneur” Regime, 52 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780485. 
 122. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. The German stock company law has been 
reformed as well. See generally Jessica Schmidt, Reforms in German Stock Corporation Law, 9 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 637 (2009). 
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GmbH form.123 Interviewees also identified several other subsidiary 
motives for the changes. For example, one lawyer suggested that Germany 
passed MoMiG partly out of a sense of “national pride”—a desire that the 
GmbH not be perceived as inferior to the U.K. Limited. He also pointed out 
that so long as a German company organized as a GmbH rather than as a 
U.K. Limited, German creditors would be better protected. Using a GmbH 
instead of a U.K. Limited would also be helpful to management and 
shareholders, he argued, because German courts would be familiar with 
GmbH law if a dispute were to arise.124 
4. Forum Shopping in Special Purpose Situations 
Several interviewees acknowledged that some forum shopping for 
entity law did occur in the European Union, but mainly in response to 
special situations. The French lawyers, for example, pointed out that 
Luxembourg offers a variety of attractive vehicles for investment funds.125 
The German lawyers cited strategic use of the SE to accomplish corporate 
restructuring, as in the case of Allianz, which has been much reported in the 
press.126 The German lawyers also agreed with scholarly assessments that 
the SE might enable a German S.A. to obtain a single-tier board and/or to 
renegotiate co-determination requirements with employees.127 The Dutch 
lawyers noted that they had seen examples of leveraged buyout (LBO) 
transactions where the participants selected an incorporation jurisdiction in 
the European Union that would facilitate necessary legal opinions to “wash 
clean” the LBO.128 But none of these narrow situations reflects a general 
trend to embrace a single new EU entity or company law jurisdiction. 
III. “UNCORPORATION” BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. 
JURISDICTIONS 
The relative stasis in substantive EU company law over the past dozen 
years or so contrasts sharply with the dramatic transformations that 
occurred in the field of U.S. unincorporated business association law a 
decade earlier. As this Part of the Article shows, limited liability companies 
(LLCs) and new limited liability forms of partnership—limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs) and limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs)—
emerged and surged in popularity through much of the 1990s as all U.S. 
jurisdictions passed laws authorizing the creation of the new entities. These 
                                                                                                                                       
 123. Freshfields Interview, supra note 103. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Didier Interview, supra note 107. 
 126. See, e.g., SE change: Allianz Becomes the First Truly European Company, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR (Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/1025923/Asian-Markets-
Archive/SE-change-Allianz-becomes-the-first-truly-European-company.html. 
 127. Freshfields Interview, supra note 103. 
 128. Norton Interview, supra note 109. 
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remarkable developments entailed significant innovation in and 
convergence of U.S. unincorporated business association laws around new 
models. Indeed, an entirely new lexicon developed to accommodate a novel 
business association environment that the late Professor Larry Ribstein 
described as “uncorporation.”129 What is particularly noteworthy for 
purposes of the EU comparison is that all of these developments occurred in 
the face of considerable uncertainty about whether and how the internal 
affairs rule applied to the new business forms. 
A.  THE RISE OF THE LLC 
The limited liability company, or “LLC” as it has come to be known, is 
an unincorporated business association comprised of members who enjoy 
considerable flexibility in structuring company management and operations 
through an internal operating agreement.130 Although an LLC is primarily a 
creature of contract (the voluntary association of its members as expressed 
through the terms of an operating agreement),131 the LLC is a legal entity 
that must be organized pursuant to prescribed state procedures that include 
a public filing.132 The LLC has both partnership and corporate 
characteristics; it is ordinarily taxed as a partnership, i.e., with no entity 
level tax,133 and combines that feature and flexible management rules with a 
corporate attribute considered equally desirable for a business entity: 
limited liability for owners and managers.134 
The origins of the LLC in the United States can be traced to a 1977 
Wyoming enactment and similar Latin American business entity laws that 
pre-date it.135 As Professor Susan Pace Hamill and others have described, 
                                                                                                                                       
 129. LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010). 
 130. See generally CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAW (2008). The operational “flexibility” noted in the text 
refers to the fact that company members may participate directly in LLC management as partners 
do in a partnership, or they may opt for centralized management of the company by one or more 
managers, similar to management by general partners in a limited partnership or by directors in a 
corporation. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 407 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(providing as a default rule that management of an LLC shall be “vested in [its] managers”). 
 131. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberger, The Closely Held Business Through the Entity Aggregate 
Prism, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 842 (2005) (collecting authorities and asserting that “the 
LLC is as much a creature of a contract among its members as it is an entity created pursuant to 
statute”). 
 132. This state formation filing is typically called “articles of organization” or a “certificate of 
organization.” See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 202 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 574 (2008) (articles of 
organization); REV. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 456 (2008) (certificate of 
organization). 
 133. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1997). 
 134. See generally Matthew G. Doré, What, Me Worry? Tort Liability Risks for Participants in 
LLCs, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 267, 269 (2011) (discussing the LLC’s limited liability shield and 
exceptions to it). 
 135. William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 855, 857–63 (1995) (describing the original Wyoming legislation and its roots in the Latin 
American limitada). 
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the LLC did not receive widespread attention in the United States until 
1988, when the Internal Revenue Service first confirmed in Revenue Ruling 
88-76 that an LLC could be taxed as a partnership, i.e., on a pass-through 
basis with no entity-level tax.136 At that time Wyoming and Florida were 
the only states authorizing formation of LLCs, and both used LLC acts that 
were primitive, cut-and-paste jobs combining various features of 
partnership, limited partnership, and corporation law.137 After 1988, when 
the LLC was finally recognized as a vehicle that provided the long-sought 
combination of owner limited liability and partnership taxation in one 
entity, other jurisdictions quickly added LLC acts to their business 
association laws and considerably refined LLC law in the process.138 
Professor Hamill has tallied the legislative count: two states enacted 
LLC laws in 1990, and four more states followed suit in 1991.139 At that 
point, as she tells it, the floodgates were wide open: 
From 1992 through 1996, LLC legislation swept across the country. In 
1992 ten additional states, including Delaware, passed legislation 
recognizing LLCs, bringing the total to eighteen. In 1993, the year 
showing the greatest number of state enactments, eighteen additional 
states passed LLC legislation, bringing the total to thirty-six. By the end of 
1994, twelve additional states, including New York and California, 
authorized the formation of LLCs under their laws. Only three remaining 
states were without LLC legislation, and by the close of 1996, they had 
passed statutes establishing the LLC in all U.S. jurisdictions.140 
These new LLC laws were not simply added to the statute books for 
show; lawyers and clients were also quick to embrace them. As Professor 
Hamill reports in another article, “[b]etween September 2, 1988, the eve of 
the IRS’s release of Revenue Ruling 88-76 (when the U.S. had less than 
100 LLC filings) and December 31, 1995, over 210,000 business ventures 
filed to become LLCs.”141 Although corporate and partnership formations 
outpaced new LLCs during this period on a national basis,142 the LLC 
continued to increase in popularity across the country each subsequent year, 
and by the mid-2000s, the formation data showed clearly that the LLC was 
                                                                                                                                       
 136. Carney, supra note 135, at 858 (stating that the 1988 revenue ruling “opened the 
floodgates” of LLC legislation); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability 
Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1998) (“After the Internal Revenue Service . . . formally 
recognized the LLC’s ability to be taxed as a partnership in 1988, interest in LLCs grew 
exponentially.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 135, at 858 (describing Wyoming’s first LLC law).  
 138. Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race, But 
Heading Where?, 45 SYR. L. REV. 1193, 1220–62 (1995) (describing the sequence of state 
adoptions and influences on the process). 
 139. Hamill, supra note 136, at 1470–74.  
 140. Id. at 1475–77.  
 141. Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate 
Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV. 393, 404 (1996). 
 142. Id. at 405.  
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on top.143 By 2011 it was fair to say that the “LLC ha[d] emerged as the 
leading entity choice for new [U.S.] businesses, surpassing even the 
corporation in popularity.”144 
Among the most remarkable features of the rise of the LLC in the 
United States was the “meteoric pace”145 of events. As described above, 
between 1988 and 1996 every American state and the District of Columbia 
followed Wyoming’s and Florida’s lead in passing LLC laws.146 Professor 
William Carney observes that “[t]he speed with which this change occurred 
is nearly unprecedented in the history of American business association 
law.”147 Professor Hamill agrees: “In an incredible stampede that took less 
than twenty years, most of it occurring from 1990 through 1996, LLCs 
traveled from an obscure unknown business form in 1977 to a well-
recognized alternative for doing business.”148 While the resulting LLC laws 
are not strictly uniform,149 the various state enactments share common 
characteristics on most key issues. As I have written, “most states drafted 
                                                                                                                                       
 143. See, e.g., Rodney D. Crisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of 
the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004–
2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J.L. & FIN. 459–60, 
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 144. Doré, supra note 134, at 269 (collecting entity formation statistics). 
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141, at 404 (referring to the “meteoric pace” of state enactments). 
 146. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 147. Carney, supra note 135, at 859.  
 148. Hamill, supra note 136, at 1478.  
 149. Drafters began work on a uniform LLC act in the early 1990s, but the final version was not 
completed until 1996, by which time nearly every jurisdiction had already adopted an LLC law. 
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Uniform Laws, Model Laws and Limited Liability 
Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 947 (1995) (describing state adoption processes and the 
relatively modest influence of NCCUSL’s Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1995) and 
the ABA’s Prototype Limited Liability Company Act (1992)). As Professor Carney and others 
have described, rather than waiting for a uniform law option, state bar associations took the lead in 
drafting new LLC acts in an attempt to keep their respective states’ business association offerings 
competitive with those already available in other parts of the country: 
 
I attribute the reasons for [the unusually rapid enactment of LLC laws] to a highly 
competitive legal market, in which lawyers seek to offer clients attractive new products at 
competitive prices. I have little doubt that local bar associations are largely responsible for 
this change . . . . Behind these bar associations are energetic lawyers constantly seeking new 
ways to better satisfy clients’ needs. I recall the conversations within the committee in 
Georgia: that some south Georgia businesses were turning to Florida LLCs, and that it was 
time for Georgia to catch up with our Florida competition. I suspect that similar conversations 
took place across the country. The rapid adoption of similar statutes by Colorado and 
neighboring states may have been influenced by the presence of the Wyoming Act. 
 
See Carney, supra note 135, at 859. 
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LLC laws by building on earlier states’ efforts much like a cook might 
tinker with a newly-received recipe.”150 
B.  THE LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP REVOLUTION 
The registered limited liability partnership, or “LLP” as it came to be 
known, is another new limited liability entity choice that has recently 
become available across all U.S. jurisdictions. Like the LLC, the LLP was 
spawned by developments in the late 1980s. The key event for the LLP was 
the savings and loan debacle, which sent thousands of financial institutions 
into receivership in the late 1980s and early 1990s.151 Federal regulators, 
seeking to hold responsible parties accountable for the crisis, turned their 
sights not only on the officers and directors of failed financial institutions, 
but also on the law firms and accounting firms who had advised them.152 
These claims highlighted for lawyers and accountants the potential benefits 
associated with practicing their profession through a limited liability entity. 
Neither limited partnerships nor professional corporations provided a sound 
alternative to the general partnership business form that most professional 
firms then used, and LLCs were not then widely available.153 
The registered LLP offered a solution. Texas enacted legislation in 
1991 that provided a partner in a general partnership with a significant 
                                                                                                                                       
 150. Doré, supra note 134, at 284; see also Tara J. Wortman, Note, Unlocking Lock-In: Limited 
Liability Companies and the Key to Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
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 151. See Matthew G. Doré, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search 
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 153. Limited partnerships were not a viable option because, under traditional limited 
partnership principles, limited partners could not actively manage a partnership and at the same 
time preserve their limited liability shield. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (amended 1985). 
Conversion to a professional corporation presented tax and organizational difficulties for many 
professional firms, and the soundness of the resulting corporate liability shield was unclear. See, 
e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections 
on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359, 377–81 (1998) (stating that “at the time of 
enactment of the recent wave of LLP legislation, there was significant authority refusing to permit 
limited liability” for lawyers). 
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measure of limited liability protection if the partnership registered as an 
LLP.154 The LLP partner was personally liable for his own actions, and for 
contractual obligations of the partnership, but not for the “errors, omissions, 
negligence, incompetence or malfeasance” of co-partners, or of partnership 
employees.155 Thus, with a simple filing and payment of nominal filing 
fees, an existing general partnership could convert to a partial-shield, 
limited liability entity.156 In all other respects, the normal “partnership” 
rules of the Uniform Partnership Act continued to apply to general 
partnerships that registered as LLPs.157 
Although the LLP marked a dramatic transformation in traditional 
partnership law, the LLC had already paved the way for that result, 
combining pass-through taxation and limited liability in a non-corporate 
structure. Nor was it surprising that the LLP form proved enormously 
attractive to professional partnerships or that other states soon emulated the 
Texas statute. According to Professor Ribstein, “[LLP legislation] was 
adopted in Louisiana in 1992, in three more jurisdictions in 1993 and in 
thirteen additional jurisdictions in 1994.”158 By 1995, half of U.S. 
jurisdictions had LLP legislation,159 and by 1998 nearly all the remaining 
states enacted such laws.160 
As was the case with LLCs, slight LLP law variations emerged over the 
course of multiple state enactments.161 The most important change was that, 
                                                                                                                                       
 154. Registration entailed an annual partnership filing with the Texas Secretary of State, 
maintenance of a designated amount of malpractice insurance, payment of an annual fee, and use 
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insurance. See J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 32:2 (2011) (“Several of the early LLP statutes . . . mandate that an LLP have 
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by the mid-1990s, states began to provide “full-shield” liability protection 
to LLP partners, affording them liability protection identical to that of a 
corporate shareholder or LLC member.162 In 1997 this change was 
incorporated as part of the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, which has 
now replaced its 1914 predecessor in most jurisdictions.163 The final LLP 
innovation, which followed close on the heels of original LLP legislation in 
most states, was the extension of full-shield limited liability protection to 
both general and limited partners in limited partnerships, creating the 
“limited liability limited partnership,” or LLLP.164 
C. THE UNCERTAIN ROLE OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE IN 
LLC AND LLP LEGISLATION 
Current state LLC and LLP acts include provisions that expressly adopt 
the internal affairs rule. For example, both the latest Uniform LLC Act and 
its predecessor provide that the law of the jurisdiction under which a 
foreign LLC is organized governs the company’s internal affairs, as well as 
the liability of company managers, members, and their transferees.165 The 
Uniform Partnership Act’s LLP provisions similarly provide that the law 
under which a foreign LLP is formed governs “relations among the partners 
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mandate insurance . . . .”). 
 162. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 323.14(2) (1995) (repealed 1997). For a complete comparative 
breakdown of the LLP liability shields in the late 1990s, see Darryl Van Duch, Some Firms 
Hesitate to Adopt L.L.P., NAT’L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A1, A20. 
 163. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306(c) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 117 (2001). The most recent count by the 
Uniform Law Commission lists thirty-nine jurisdictions as having adopted the Uniform 
Partnership Act. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Partnership Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership Act (last visited Apr. 11, 
2014). 
 164. See Carter S. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations: Limited 
Liability Companies and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985, 1003–04 (1995). The pattern 
of LLLP laws is more varied than laws governing LLCs and LLPs. A few jurisdictions expressly 
prohibit LLLPs; other jurisdictions expressly authorize them through provisions in general or 
limited partnership statutes; the remaining jurisdictions authorize LLLPs inferentially through 
general partnership LLP provisions. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, A User’s Guide to the New 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 583, 619 n.170 (2004). As Professor 
Kleinberger’s article explains, the most recent version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
expressly includes LLLP provisions. As of fall 2012, nineteen jurisdictions had adopted that 
statute. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Partnership Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, 
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Limited Partnership Act (last visited Feb 
9, 2014). 
 165. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 801(a) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 515 (2008) (“The law of the . . . 
jurisdiction under which a foreign limited liability company is formed governs: (1) the internal 
affairs of the company; and (2) the liability of a member as member and a manager as manager 
[for company obligations].”); id. § 1001(a), at 640 (“The laws of the . . . jurisdiction under which 
a foreign limited liability company is organized govern its organization and internal affairs and the 
liability of its managers, members, and their transferees.”); see also The Revised Prototype 
Limited Liability Company Act, 67 BUS. LAW. 117, 186 (2011) (noting, in comment to section 
801, that “[LLC] acts around the country . . . [provide] that the organization and internal affairs of 
a foreign limited liability company are governed by the laws of its jurisdiction of formation”). 
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and between the partners and the partnership and the liability of partners for 
obligations of the partnership.”166 States that have adopted non-uniform 
versions of these laws do the same.167 
In contrast to the clarity of current law on these points, during the 
period when LLCs and LLPs first emerged and when states were rushing to 
craft legislation authorizing them, it was far from clear whether and how the 
internal affairs rule applied to the new entities and whether their limited 
liability shields would be respected outside the jurisdictions in which the 
entities were organized.168 As Professor Carney describes it, “LLCs 
remained surrounded with uncertainties” at this time, including 
“uncertainties about the extent of limited liability for members where LLCs 
did business outside their home jurisdiction in a foreign state lacking 
authorizing legislation for LLCs.”169 A similar uneasiness applied with 
respect to LLPs operating outside their formation state.170 
The primary concern was that if litigation were commenced against an 
LLC or LLP doing business in a jurisdiction that had not yet adopted a 
similar law, or at least a law providing for the qualification of foreign LLCs 
or LLPs, courts in the forum state might decide that recognizing the foreign 
                                                                                                                                       
 166. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 1101(a) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 255 (2001). 
 167. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-901(a)(1) (2013) (“The laws of the . . . jurisdiction . . 
. under which a foreign limited liability company is organized govern its . . . internal affairs and 
the liability of its members and managers . . . .”). It may seem odd that these statutory choice-of-
law rules encompass not only internal affairs but also limited liability rules that affect third 
parties, which are clearly external affairs. Nonetheless, accepted corporate conflict of law 
principles normally defer to the organizing jurisdiction on similar limited liability issues. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 307 (1971) (providing that “the local law of 
the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder’s 
liability to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate 
debts”). 
 168. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the 
Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375, 448–56 (1992) (arguing that U.S. jurisdictions should treat a 
foreign LLC like a foreign corporation and thereby respect both the company and its limited 
liability shield); Joseph A. Rodriguez, Comment, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Limited 
Liability and Taxation Concerns in Other Jurisdictions, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 539, 539 
(1992) (examining “the potential problems that a Wyoming LLC may face if it extends its 
operations into foreign jurisdictions”). 
 169. Carney, supra note 135, at 859; accord Thomas E. Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You 
Have Not Been Told You May Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in Interstate Transactions, 58 
BAYLOR L. REV. 205, 206 (2006) (“When . . . LLCs . . . were available in relatively few states, 
there existed a continuing uneasiness with the use of these novel structures in interstate commerce 
because of uncertainty regarding whether limited liability would be retained for the members (and 
managers) doing business in those jurisdictions that had not yet adopted LLC acts.”). 
 170. See Martin I. Lubaroff, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: The Next Wave, 
FORMING AND USING LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, at 
503, 539 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 836, 1994) (“[If] a partnership 
operates solely in a state that recognizes an LLP and is formed under the laws of that state, there 
should not be any question concerning recognition . . . . Apart from [that] example, under a more 
traditional choice-of-law analysis, consideration must be given to the extent of the relationship of 
a partnership with the state of formation and to the conflict of law approach under the law of the 
jurisdiction in which litigation arises . . . .”). 
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entity and its liability shield would be contrary to the forum state’s own 
policy interests. Those policy interests might include the fact that the forum 
state had not yet authorized such novel entities and that the foreign entity’s 
limited liability shield could limit recovery by claimants from the forum 
state.171 
Some scholars reasoned that states without LLC or LLP laws might 
nonetheless respect and apply such laws as enacted by other states. The 
basis for recognition might be principles of comity172 or requirements under 
the Full Faith and Credit or Interstate Commerce clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution.173 But it was difficult to be confident on either score because 
the extension of limited liability principles made by LLC and LLP laws 
could easily raise policy concerns on the part of states that had not yet 
enacted them. 
As more and more states adopted LLC and LLP laws through the 
1990s, and certainly as more and more LLC and LLP statutes expressly 
embraced the internal affairs rule through foreign qualification provisions, 
concerns ultimately subsided about application of the internal affairs rule to 
foreign LLCs and LLPs, and about respect for their liability shields across 
state lines.174 The point, for present purposes, is that given the initial 
uncertainty surrounding the internal affairs rule as applied in the new LLC 
and LLP settings, one can hardly credit application of the internal affairs 
rule, and the jurisdictional competition it facilitates, as the sole reason why 
U.S. jurisdictions so readily embraced LLC and LLP laws. 
                                                                                                                                       
 171. See, e.g., Keatinge, supra note 168, at 452 (“If an LLC member is analogized to a limited 
partner or general partner . . . , the Restatement does not provide a dispositive rule as to whether 
the forum state would adopt the limited liability provisions of the LLC’s state of organization. 
Instead, section 295 of the Restatement indicates that the local law of the state selected by 
applying the rules under section 6(2) of the Restatement would govern. Section 6(2) gives the 
forum court wide latitude in examining the critical ‘relevant policies of the forum’ factor.”). 
 172. Comity is the conflict of laws principle that a state will recognize and effectuate the laws 
of another state so long as the foreign state’s law does not conflict with local law or raise other 
policy concerns. As one source recently expressed it, in the United States, “comity has served as a 
principle of deference to foreign law and foreign courts . . . .” Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of 
International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (2008). For an argument that states 
without LLC laws might recognize foreign LLCs based on principles of comity, see Keatinge, 
supra note 168, at 453–54. For a similar argument concerning LLPs, see Lubaroff, supra note 
170, at 536.  
 173. See Keatinge, supra note 168, at 454–56 (making Full Faith and Credit and Interstate 
Commerce Clause arguments for recognition of foreign LLCs); Lubaroff, supra note 170, at 536 
(making Full Faith and Credit Clause argument for recognition of LLPs). 
 174. For an analysis of a few lingering concerns about the scope of liability protection for 
participants in LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs that do business across state lines, see Rutledge, supra 
note 169.  
348 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
IV. COMPARING THE RECENT EUROPEAN AND U.S. 
EXPERIENCES 
If the new EU internal affairs rule and the EU legal changes described 
in Part I permit jurisdictional competition in the field of European company 
law, why have Europe’s company laws not changed and converged in 
content as their U.S. corporate counterparts have? And if the internal affairs 
rule is a key driver of jurisdictional competition and convergence, why did 
U.S. unincorporated business association laws change and converge 
dramatically to embrace LLCs and LLPs, even before it became clear that 
the internal affairs rule applied to the new entities? This Part argues that the 
answer lies in nuanced views of jurisdictional competition and corporate 
law convergence patterns that several scholars have recently advanced. 
These views not only provide alternative perspectives on these issues, but 
also serve as a helpful reminder that focusing on jurisdictional competition 
and convergence patterns can obscure a key purpose of comparative 
corporate governance study—to learn from other legal systems. 
A. CHALLENGES TO MARKET COMPETITION THEORIES OF 
CORPORATE LAW CONVERGENCE 
As explained in the Introduction, commentators have long contended 
that corporate laws are shaped by market forces and jurisdictional 
competition that the internal affairs rule makes possible.175 Part I.A further 
described how law and economics scholars have built on this assumption 
and made stronger claims: that the internal affairs rule, together with market 
forces, promote adoption of more efficient corporate laws that eliminate 
unnecessary regulation.176 Recall as well the prediction that the “end of 
history” for corporate law would be marked by global convergence on a 
shareholder-centered model of the corporation.177 
But there are competing views. For example, Professor Mark Roe has 
explained that the development and survival of corporate laws and 
institutions are influenced not only by efficiency considerations, but also by 
“initial, often accidental conditions (chaos theory), [by] the history of 
problems that had to be solved in the past but that may be irrelevant today 
(path dependence), and [by] evolutionary accidents—what might do best 
today could have been selected out for extinction in the past.”178 Although 
Roe agrees that the laws and institutions that survive “cannot be too 
inefficient,” he contends that an “evolution-toward-efficiency” theory 
“constrains but does not fully determine” the current condition of business 
                                                                                                                                       
 175. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 178. Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 
(1996). 
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association laws.179 To take one example, Roe’s seminal work Strong 
Managers, Weak Owners illustrates the phenomenon of “path dependency,” 
explaining how populist politics operating in a federal system limited the 
role of financial institutions in U.S. corporate governance, and thus put state 
corporate laws on a different “path” than those adopted in other 
countries.180 Among other important lessons, Roe’s work demonstrates that 
efficiency considerations are not the only forces that determine the content 
of business association law; historical accidents, political vectors, and 
resulting path dependencies are also important determinants that shape its 
contours. 
Building on Roe’s work, Professor Ronald Gilson has argued that 
corporate institutions respond to competitive pressures in a variety of ways. 
These include adoption of what Gilson calls “functional convergence” 
measures, where the formal legal environment remains static, but corporate 
actors utilize available flexibility within the existing legal system to find 
new solutions “within their path dependent limits.”181 In Gilson’s words, 
“institutions are shaped by a form of corporate governance plate tectonics, 
in which the demands of current circumstances grind against the influence 
of initial conditions.”182 
More recently, Professor Donald Clarke has argued that comparative 
corporate governance scholarship places undue emphasis on convergence as 
a function of competitive economic pressures.183 “Since corporations have 
not as an empirical matter all migrated out of all countries except one (the 
one that has the best rules),” he points out, “it must not be true that selection 
pressures work the way the [law and economics] story says they do.”184 
Professor Franklin Gevurtz also disputes that corporate law 
convergence is the inevitable result of competitive pressures for ever more 
efficient laws.185 Gevurtz agrees with Roe and Gilson that path 
dependencies and other forces may preserve divergent corporate laws 
despite the laws’ relative merits on an efficiency scale, and he argues 
further that corporate law convergence can occur as a result of “fads and 
fashions,” promoting new norms that lack any particular efficiency 
                                                                                                                                       
 179. Id.  
 180. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994); see also Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (describing two sources of path dependence: initial 
ownership structures and initial corporate law rules). 
 181. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 338 (2001). 
 182. Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions 
Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 332 (1996). 
 183. Donald C. Clarke, 'Nothing but Wind’? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2011). 
 184. Id. at 100. 
 185. Gevurtz, supra note 25.  
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advantage.186 Most importantly, Gevurtz reminds us that the critical 
tensions that corporate and other business association laws must address—
tensions between owners and managers, owners and creditors, majority 
owners and minority owners, etc.—have never been capable of easy 
resolution.187 As a result, he contends, global convergence around any one 
solution or set of solutions that purports to resolve those issues is unlikely, 
if not impossible.188 
B.  THE EU EXPERIENCE AND FORCES OF DIVERGENCE 
Considered from the perspective of these more nuanced scholarly views 
about competition and corporate law convergence, it is not entirely 
surprising that European jurisdictions have not yet competed vigorously in 
the field of company law despite the freedom to do so and that European 
company laws do not yet all conform to the most efficient alternatives. 
Recall the various forces of divergence described in Part II.A: franchise tax 
obstacles that may diminish incentives for EU Member States to compete 
for new company formations; the importance of judicial expertise in 
creating an attractive company law for foreign users; uncertainty about the 
scope of the new EU internal affairs rule and the mechanics of corporate 
mobility; ongoing compliance difficulties and possible litigation obstacles 
that pseudo-foreign companies may face within the European Union; as 
well as cultural and political disincentives that might discourage use of 
foreign company laws.189 Whether best understood as vestiges of path 
dependence or as idiosyncratic counterweights that naturally resist 
efficiency-based forces, these vectors, individually or collectively, may well 
be sufficiently powerful to overcome natural competitive pressures that 
favor more permissive company laws. 
Alternatively, and taking a leaf from Professor Gilson’s convergence 
analysis, EU countries directly threatened by outside competition, such as 
France, Germany, and the Netherlands have faced from the United 
Kingdom, may have already accomplished functional convergence with the 
United Kingdom with reforms that favorably affect cost and speed of 
company formation.190 These modest legal adjustments may alleviate the 
need for more extensive, conforming changes to French, German, and 
Dutch company laws. When the U.S. experience with uncorporation is 
added to the discussion, there is some evidence of a related trend on the 
                                                                                                                                       
 186. Id. at 496–500.  
 187. Id. at 511–20.  
 188. Id. at 520.  
 189. See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text. 
 190. As described in Part II.A, two potentially important advantages that a European company 
law could offer over its competitors in other Member States—low filing fees and rapid processing 
of entity formation paperwork—appear to have prompted some movement within the European 
Union towards the U.K. Limited and modest conforming changes in at least three Member States’ 
business entity laws. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
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importance of costs. At least one study has found that the use of new LLC 
laws over corporation laws across the United States is best predicted not by 
the content of such laws, but rather by start-up costs—specifically, whether 
the LLC enjoys a formation fee advantage over a corporation.191 
C.  THE U.S. UNCORPORATION EXPERIENCE AND INEFFICIENT 
FORCES OF CONVERGENCE 
The convergence of U.S. unincorporated business association laws 
around new LLC and LLP entity options is a useful counterexample to the 
European experience and may illustrate the impact of what Professors Roe 
or Gevurtz might characterize as “inefficient” convergence forces. These 
novel laws developed and converged across the United States at a time 
when it was not yet clear that the internal affairs rule applied to the new 
entities, thus making jurisdictional competition for new entity formations at 
best a weak force promoting change and convergence.192 Even today, when 
statutory law makes clear that the internal affairs rule applies to LLCs and 
LLPs, there is little evidence of inter-jurisdictional competition for 
“uncorporation” formations.193 If not competition for entity formations 
under the internal affairs rule and pressures to enact ever more efficient 
business association laws, what forces prompted convergence of state laws 
around new LLC and LLP options? 
                                                                                                                                       
 191. See Daniel M. Hausermann, For a Few Dollars Less: Explaining State to State Variation 
in Limited Liability Company Popularity, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) (finding that 
formation fee differentials explain more of the variation of LLC popularity across jurisdictions 
than any other factor). 
 192. See supra Part III.C. 
 193. Three separate empirical studies have found little evidence that U.S. jurisdictions currently 
compete for LLC formations, or that such competition (as it exists) favors Delaware more than at 
the margins. See Jens Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies 
Formed? An Empirical Analysis, 55 J. L. & ECON. 741 (2012) (finding that for LLCs with more 
than twenty members, companies are more likely to be formed outside the state of their primary 
place of business if the primary place of business does not allow members to trigger the 
dissolution on oppression grounds, or if it does not shield from veil piercing for the mere failure to 
observe formalities); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 OR. L. REV. 57, 57–58 
(2012) (reporting results of an attorney survey showing that attorneys forming LLCs evidenced a 
modest preference for Delaware when forming LLCs outside their home state); Bruce H. 
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited 
Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94 (summarizing findings of “little evidence that 
[LLCs] choose to form outside their home state in order to take advantage of variations in [LLC] 
statutory provisions” and some evidence that large LLCs are more likely to organize outside their 
home state, with Delaware as the “dominant” destination jurisdiction). Indeed, one scholar has 
recently argued that “the high level of contractability and the resulting reduction in legal 
indeterminacy available under LLC law” reduces Delaware’s traditional competitive advantages 
in the LLC field when compared to those that Delaware enjoys in corporate law. Mohsen Manesh, 
Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractability and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 
B.C. L. REV. 189, 189 (2011). 
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1.  A “Better Law” Movement, Path Dependent Development, 
or “Fad and Fashion”? 
Of course, competition for entity formations under the internal affairs 
rule is only one chapter in the law market story. In the view of some 
scholars, “the United States has fostered an active law market, not because 
of the choice-of-law rules themselves, but because of the dynamism 
inherent in the institutional features of the American federal system.”194 
Even if states have not competed to attract new LLCs and LLPs, the 
uncorporation revolution might be characterized as a movement by states 
towards substantively better or more efficient laws within a broader market 
for business association laws across the United States. Thus, one might 
argue, the primary reason new uncorporation laws spread rapidly across 
jurisdictions was because states recognized that these new entities offered 
sound solutions for vexing tax, liability, and organizational problems 
confronting closely held businesses. 
As described in Part III, LLC and LLP laws accomplish a striking 
achievement—combining limited liability, pass-through taxation, and 
organizational flexibility in one unincorporated business entity.195 Because 
these new entities are primarily creatures of contract (an LLC operating 
agreement or an LLP partnership agreement), they are also products of 
private ordering processes that should foster efficient outcomes, and many 
law and economics scholars support the expansion of limited liability on 
efficiency grounds.196 Without question, the lawyers who drafted LLC and 
LLP laws and who pressed for their passage in the various states—typically 
through state bar association committees—had no doubt about the benefits 
the new entities offered for their business clients.197 Why should we be 
surprised that states rushed to authorize LLCs and LLPs? 
But there were countervailing considerations. To state the obvious, 
expanding the reach of pass-through taxation, and thus eliminating one 
                                                                                                                                       
 194. Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Rules and Institutions in Developing a Law Market: 
Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TULANE L. REV. 2147, 2162 (2008). 
 195. See notes 135–138, 152–156 and accompanying text; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1995); see generally Hamill, 
supra note 141, at 395.  
 196. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 433, 450–51 (1995) (arguing that the economic justifications for limited liability 
are valid in closely held LLCs); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the 
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 101–06 (1991) (arguing that limited liability is efficient even in 
closely held firms). 
 197. Professor Ribstein and other law and economics scholars have characterized these new 
laws as examples of legal innovations that were largely byproducts of practicing business lawyers 
who drafted laws and lobbied for their enactment on behalf of clients. Bruce H. Kobayashi & 
Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a Byproduct: Theories of Private Law Production 19–20 (Ill. Law, 
Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research Paper Series, Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/SSRN-id1884985_(1).pdf; see also supra note 149 
(exploring Professor William Carney’s similar assessment of LLC laws).  
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level of tax, may have diminished state revenues.198 And extending the 
corporate limited liability shield to non-corporate entities shifted tort 
liability risks to accident victims who would rarely, if ever, be able to 
protect themselves in advance by contract.199 
Yet, whether or not new LLC and LLP laws offered economic 
efficiency or other advantages that outweighed these concerns was not 
debated or even discussed as the laws were passed in state legislatures. As 
several commentators have shown, LLC and LLP laws were enacted by 
legislators who assumed without question that the new entity options would 
be “good for business,” and without any serious debate about the merits of 
the new business formats.200 Dean Allan Vestal and unincorporated 
business law expert Thomas Rutledge conclude after a “close review of the 
legislative record” that “in state after state the serious policy and fiscal 
implications of [LLCs] were not even addressed, much less seriously 
discussed.”201 
Commentator Bill Callison concurs with the Vestal/Rutledge analysis 
and analogizes the rapid movement by states to extend limited liability 
through LLC and LLP laws to the cattle herd that stampedes when the 
coyote howls.202 Callison disputes the economic efficiency justifications 
that have been advanced for the new entities203 and instead makes the case 
that the LLC/LLP movement illustrates Roe’s path dependence model: 
                                                                                                                                       
 198. Allan W. Vestal & Thomas E. Rutledge, Disappointing Diogenes: The LLC Debate That 
Never Was, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 80–90 (2006) (examining revenue implications of expanded 
pass-through entity taxation in Kentucky). 
 199. Id. at 72–73; see also Doré, supra note 134, at 270–71.  
 200. See generally Vestal & Rutledge, supra note 198; accord Robert W. Hillman, New Forms 
and New Balances: Organizing the External Relations of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 613, 613 (1997) (“Like Diogenes wandering the streets of Athens, lantern in hand, 
searching for the honest man, anyone seeking evidence of a debate among lawmakers over the 
wisdom of limited liability or the cost-shifting consequences of LLCs and LLPs is destined for 
disappointment.”); Robert W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 615, 627 (1997) (noting that legislatures in earlier times (e.g., the nineteenth century) 
displayed “a level of inquiry, a quality of debate, and an awareness of history that is largely absent 
from contemporary discussions of limited liability”); see also Allan W. Vestal, “Real 
Partnerships” and Real Problems, Conforming Business Entity Law to Fiscal Realities and 
Popular Conceptions, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 880 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he policy implications 
of extending limited liability to the members of [general partnerships through the LLP] were never 
seriously discussed”); Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and the Real 
World, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 691 (1997) (“[S]tates that have broadened the LLP concept 
have in effect reversed the default rule without in any way considering or justifying that action.”); 
but see Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 149, 951–52 (“[T]he collective wisdom over time of 
fifty-one legislatures and bar drafting committees must be far greater than that of one uniform or 
model law drafting organization.”). 
 201. Vestal & Rutledge, supra note 198, at 55.  
 202. J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited Liability 
Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951, 961 (2001) 
(“[L]egislators failed to consider the public policy aspects of expansive limited liability protection 
before they acted . . . .”). 
 203. Id. at 964–71.  
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“[T]he IRS’s regulatory response to Wyoming LLCs,” he argues, 
“introduced dynamic forces into business organization law, and the law 
responded by referring back to, and evolving from, existing structures and 
rules.”204 Whether or not Callison’s path dependence analysis is accurate, 
his herd analogy is illuminating. Given the lack of policy debate in state 
legislatures concerning LLC and LLP laws that Vestal, Rutledge, and others 
have demonstrated, one is strongly tempted to conclude that the passage of 
these entity laws illustrates what Professor Gevurtz calls “fads and 
fashions” in business association law—where laws of multiple jurisdictions 
converge in a popular trend without regard for legal efficiency or other 
considerations.205 
2. Rule-Driven Path Dependence (Foreignness Matters) 
Theories of path-dependent evolution of business association laws also 
encompass “rule-driven path dependence”: the idea that existing structures 
and institutions influence choices about what rules should be adopted or 
maintained in the future.206 One way this might occur is that the 
“foreignness” (or not) of a new business association law—a factor unrelated 
to the competitive merits of any particular law—might influence change 
and convergence patterns across jurisdictions. The stasis in European 
company law, when compared to the U.S. uncorporation revolution, could 
well be an example of this phenomenon. 
Remember that although corporate laws across different national 
jurisdictions share many common functional characteristics,207 formal rules 
of corporate regulation differ significantly across nations, including across 
EU Member States with harmonized company law.208 Of those 
commentators who correctly predicted that the EU legal developments 
described in Part I.B would not produce dramatic change and convergence 
in the field of European company law, several based their forecast on a 
variety of obstacles that these formal legal differences might create, along 
with related cultural and political hurdles.209 
                                                                                                                                       
 204. Id. at 962.  
 205. Gevurtz, supra note 25, at 496–97.  
 206. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 180, at 154 (“Corporate rules, we argue, are themselves 
path dependent. The rules that an economy has at any given point in time depend on, and reflect, 
the ownership and governance structures that the economy had initially . . . . The initial structures 
affect future corporate rules which in turn affect future decisions on corporate structures.”). 
 207. See generally REINER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004) (using a functional approach to show how 
countries with very different legal rules have developed similar solutions to common corporate 
law problems). 
 208. For example, of the five different corporate law jurisdictions selected for comparative 
analysis in The Anatomy of Corporate Law, three (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) are 
EU Member States. See id. 
 209. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. Consistent with these predictions, the EU 
legal experts the author interviewed all expressed concerns that a European business would face 
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The recent U.S. uncorporation experience bolsters those predictions, 
albeit as a counter-example. One reason that it was easy for U.S. 
jurisdictions to rapidly embrace LLCs and LLPs was that the novel entities 
were not particularly “foreign” to new users. LLC and LLP laws, though 
new, were adapted from familiar common sources—general partnership, 
limited partnership, and corporate law—that were shared by all states.210 In 
addition, U.S. business association laws, including new LLC and LLP laws, 
are more limited in scope than their European counterparts, which often 
include not only creditors’ rights, but also employment law provisions as 
well.211 The narrower reach of U.S. business association laws reduces the 
potential scope of any legal conflicts that might otherwise impede the 
adoption of such laws across jurisdictions.212 Finally, while the new EU 
internal affairs rule has had a mixed reception across Europe,213 lawyers 
                                                                                                                                       
reputational obstacles and uncertain compliance burdens if it organized under another Member 
State’s law and operated domestically as a pseudo-foreign company. See supra notes 101–111 and 
accompanying text. 
 210. Consider the state of U.S. business association law in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
time period when LLC and LLP laws first emerged. Then, as now, the corporate law of nearly all 
states was derived from one of only two primary sources—the ABA’s Model Business 
Corporation Act or the Delaware General Corporation Law. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 23,  
§ 2:5 (noting that “[e]ventually, the Model Act became the pattern for large parts of the 
corporation statutes in most states”); see also Gorris et al., supra note 23. State general and limited 
partnership laws were even more uniform at that time than they are today, with nearly all state 
laws for general partnerships based on the Uniform Partnership Act, and in the case of limited 
partnerships, either the original or revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Thus, when a lawyer 
or her business client encountered a “foreign” corporation or partnership—one organized in 
another U.S. jurisdiction—that entity was not very foreign at all and would not have raised 
reputational concerns for the lawyer or client. At that time it was fair to say that in the United 
States, a general partnership was the same legal entity, regardless of the state law under which it 
was organized. The same was largely true for limited partnerships and corporations. 
 211. Not only do European company laws often include important creditors’ rights provisions, 
bankruptcy laws also vary across the European Union. See Luca Enriques & Martin Gelter, How 
the Old World Encountered the New One: Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in European 
Corporate and Bankruptcy Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 577, 581, 622–23 (2007); see also Federico M. 
Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in the U.S. and 
the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 421 (2012) (noting the connections between creditor 
protections in European company laws and rates of reincorporation). For a discussion of European 
company law provisions protecting employees, see supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 212. U.S. business association laws leave most creditor protection issues to other law, important 
parts of which are either uniform (e.g., the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act) or federal, in the 
case of bankruptcy. Moreover, all U.S. jurisdictions address employment law matters separately 
from business association law and much of that law is federalized and thus effectively uniform 
across the states.  
 213. As described in Part I.B., the various EU Member States did not adopt a new European 
internal affairs rule because of a shared belief in the rule’s merits—what one might call a “bottom-
up” approach to choice of law. Rather, the ECJ imposed the internal affairs rule on the Member 
States from the top down, through novel case law interpretations of the EU Treaty. As described 
in Part II, this state of affairs produced uncertainty not only about the scope and applicability of 
the new internal affairs rule, but also about attendant procedures necessary for businesses to 
effectively utilize the rule, like foreign qualification processes and foreign jurisdiction litigation 
risks. See supra notes 74–78 and 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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across U.S. jurisdictions have confidence in the internal affairs rule and the 
foreign qualification processes that have developed along with it. After an 
initial period of uncertainty, these familiar processes were later easily 
adapted to the new unincorporated entity options, thus reducing the risks 
associated with foreign operations under the new laws.214 
In short, one might fairly describe new LLC and LLP laws as old wine 
in new bottles for the most part. Whatever the analogy, when one compares 
the U.S. uncorporation revolution to company law stasis in Europe, it is 
tempting to conclude that the foreignness (or not) of business association 
laws across jurisdictions—a factor largely unrelated to competitiveness and 
efficiency merits of any particular new law—influences the rate of change 
and convergence of competing business association laws. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING 
FROM COMPARISONS 
The persistent stasis in European company law following new 
possibilities for jurisdictional competition for company formations within 
the European Union, and the unexpected convergence of U.S. jurisdictions 
on novel unincorporated business forms before the internal affairs rule 
clearly applied to them, both call into question the traditional view that 
jurisdictional competition under the internal affairs rule, and related market 
pressures that favor the adoption of ever more “efficient” business 
association laws, are the principal drivers of corporate and business 
association law convergence. Indeed, it may be the case that no single 
theory will likely predict successfully how state and national business 
association laws will change and evolve. But to concede that fact does not 
diminish the importance of comparative law scholarship in the business 
association law field. 
Both Professors Clarke and Gevurtz have recently reminded us that if 
comparative corporate governance study focuses solely on competition and 
convergence of business association laws, we will likely miss opportunities 
to learn from the approaches taken by other legal systems. As Professor 
Clarke puts it, “[t]here is value in determining which features of which 
system do what well and do what badly. If policy advocacy has any real-
                                                                                                                                       
 214. As explained in Part III.C, while there was some early uncertainty in the United States 
about whether the internal affairs rule applied to novel entities like LLCs and LLPs, the rule 
stands on much firmer footing here than it does in the European Union. In the early years of LLC 
and LLP laws, uncertainty concerning the internal affairs rule stemmed only from the fact that all 
jurisdictions had not yet adopted such laws. As states enacted LLC and LLP acts, none deviated 
from the internal affairs choice-of-law approach. Thus, jurisdictions embraced the rule in bottom-
up fashion, reflecting the business law community’s confidence in and comfort with the 
correctness of that choice-of-law approach for the new entities. In addition, limited partnership 
and corporate laws provided a familiar and simple template for the new entity laws’ foreign 
qualification processes, thus eliminating concerns about compliance for any LLCs or LLPs that 
might do business across state lines. 
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world effect, then one should advocate what seems to work well, regardless 
of what direction the rest of the world is going in.”215 
In the words of Professor Gevurtz: 
[To dispute efficiency theories of corporate law convergence] is not to say 
that observing other nations’ corporate laws is useless or unwise. If 
nothing else, we will learn that there are alternate approaches which may 
be as effective as our own. We may also learn, however, that when it 
comes to the really tough issues, no nation has a good solution—which is 
why these are the really tough issues in corporate law.216 
And, in fact, there are many good reasons to compare U.S. corporate 
and unincorporated business association law experience with company law 
developments in Europe now that it is apparent that European company law 
schemes will continue to depart in important ways from traditional U.S. 
models. Areas for productive inquiry could include the following: 
U.S. Benefit Corporations and European Company Law Stakeholder 
Models. A number of U.S. jurisdictions have recently authorized new 
corporate forms, called “benefit” or “B-” corporations, which are permitted 
to advance non-shareholder interests alongside a traditional, for-profit 
agenda.217 As this movement occurs, important questions are resurfacing 
about which corporate stakeholders are worthy of special protection and the 
most effective corporate governance mechanisms to accomplish that goal. 
One hot topic, for example, is whether a corporation must have special 
obligations to protect the environment in order to qualify as a benefit 
corporation. A number of states have enacted the “B-Lab” organization’s 
model benefit corporation legislation, which requires that a benefit 
corporation’s charter must have as an objective “to provide a material 
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as 
assessed against a third-party standard.”218 A few states, like California, 
have enacted a “flexible public purpose” corporation law alongside the B-
Lab’s model benefit corporation law, with the former defining “public 
benefit” in broader terms.219 Looking to past and present European 
company law experience with stakeholder protection may help shed light on 
these and other issues that will undoubtedly emerge as benefit corporation 
                                                                                                                                       
 215. Clarke, supra note 183, at 103.  
 216. Gevurtz, supra note 25, at 520–21.  
 217. So far, eighteen states have enacted benefit corporation laws based on Model Benefit 
Corporation Legislation promulgated by the B-Lab group. See Legislation, B LAB, 
http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation (last visited Apr. 11, 2014); see also 
Michael R. Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0—A Breakthrough in 
Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047 (2011). 
 218. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B Lab 2013), available at 
http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf 
(Definitions). 
 219. See Arthur Rieman et al., California’s New Hybrid Corporation Statute, L.A. LAW., Sept. 
2012, at 19. 
358 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 8 
legislation takes root. Fortunately, comparative corporate governance 
scholarship is now emerging on these topics.220 
Fiduciary Duties in the Zone of Insolvency and Wrongful Trading 
Liability Standards. Much ink has been spilled over the vexing problem of 
whether or when managers of U.S. corporations and other business 
associations owe duties to creditors, and the topic of fiduciary duties of 
managers of businesses operating in the “zone of insolvency” has attracted 
renewed attention following the recent recession.221 Perhaps an examination 
of European wrongful trading liability standards, which penalize directors 
who take no action to protect creditors’ interests during their company’s 
slide into insolvency, will yield fresh insights.222 Comparative corporate 
governance scholarship is beginning to emerge on this topic as well.223 
Regulation of Pseudo-Foreign Entities in the United States and 
Europe. Application of the internal affairs rule to pseudo-foreign entities—
firms not organized under the law of their real seat jurisdiction and whose 
only connection to the organizing jurisdiction is the company’s charter—
raises special concerns. The United States might usefully learn from 
European experience in this area as well. 
The legal developments in the European Union described in Part I.B 
have not met with unqualified acceptance. Justin Borg-Barthet, a scholar 
who has extensively studied the new EU internal affairs rule, makes a 
persuasive case that Europe should enact legislation that scales back 
application of the internal affairs rule for pseudo-foreign companies.224 He 
proposes choice-of-law reforms for the European Union that would permit a 
real seat Member State to require pseudo-foreign companies to comply with 
critical components of the Member State’s company law.225 As students of 
American corporate law will recognize, these arguments echo both 
                                                                                                                                       
 220. See, e.g., Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309 (2011); Alissa Mickels, Note, 
Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with 
Director Duties in the U.S. and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271 (2009). 
 221. See, e.g., John A. Pearce & Ilya A. Lipin, The Duties of Directors and Officers Within the 
Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 361 (2011); Neil Ruben, Note, Duty to 
Creditors in Insolvency and the Zone of Insolvency: Delaware and the Alternatives, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& BUS. 333 (2010). 
 222. For a discussion of wrongful trading standards see Andrew Keay, Wrongful Trading and 
the Liability of Company Directors: A Theoretical Perspective, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (2006). 
 223. See, e.g., Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, Solving Creditor Problems in the 
Twilight Zone: Superfluous Law and Inadequate Private Solutions, 34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 61 
(2012). 
 224. BORG-BARTHET, supra note 37, at 142–70. Borg-Barthet points out that corporate choice-
of-law principles are derived theories of party autonomy that also influence contractual choice-of-
law principles. Id. at 21. Although the latter often command application of the law chosen by 
contracting parties, he notes, choice-of-law theory recognizes that public policy considerations 
sometimes justify a jurisdiction’s decision to override that choice. Id. at 19–29. Borg-Barthet 
contends that the same must therefore be true for the internal affairs rule. 
 225. Id. at 149–70.  
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continuing criticisms of the internal affairs rule as applied in corporate 
law226 and the modified version of the internal affairs rules that California 
and New York apply to pseudo-foreign corporations with strong ties to 
those states.227 
While there are potential Commerce Clause objections to internal 
affairs rules exceptions,228 the issue certainly merits current consideration in 
the field of LLC law. The use of LLCs as asset protection devices has raised 
concerns, for example, about whether the internal affairs rule should apply 
when creditors of LLC members obtain charging orders.229 Moreover, while 
state LLC acts are broadly similar across the country, many diverge 
considerably on at least one critical issue: the extent to which participants in 
an LLC may waive fundamental fiduciary duties when adopting or 
amending the company’s operating agreement.230 Delaware, unlike most 
states, permits participants in LLCs to eliminate all fiduciary duty 
protections.231 For a U.S. jurisdiction that values fiduciary standards, a 
modified internal affairs rule for pseudo-foreign LLCs—perhaps one 
patterned on California’s or New York’s corporate choice-of-law rules, or 
on the new internal affairs rule models that Borg-Barthet proposes for the 
European Union—could protect the state’s LLC law on fiduciary duties 
against incursions from Delaware or other jurisdictions with more lax 
requirements. 
                                                                                                                                       
 226. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Democracy and the Dominance of Delaware in Corporate Law, 
67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2004). 
 227. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 2010) (establishing a multi-part test to determine 
whether a corporation’s dominant relationship is with California and providing that specific 
provisions of the California Corporations Code will apply to such corporations); N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW §§ 1319–20 (McKinney 2012) (providing that certain New York rules on shareholder rights 
and mergers are applicable to non-public corporations that conduct more than one-half of their 
business income activities in New York). 
 228. Allmendinger, supra note 56, at 83 (noting that “the issue of whether the laws on pseudo-
foreign companies are constitutional under the Commerce Clause is . . . unresolved in legal 
debate” and citing authorities). 
 229. See Jay D. Adkisson et al., Recent Developments in Charging Orders, BUS. L. TODAY, 
Feb. 2013, at 1, 3 (stating that “[T]he courts are just beginning to scratch the conflicts-of-law 
issues”). 
 230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2013) (“to the extent that, at law or in equity, a . . . 
manager . . . has duties (including fiduciary duties) to [the LLC] or [any] member . . . , [the] 
manager’s . . . duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the [LLC 
operating] agreement; provided, that the [LLC operating] agreement may not eliminate the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). 
 231. See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After 
More Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 568 (2007) (“Some states contain 
mandatory statutory standards, while others defer to the contractual provisions adopted by the 
LLC members. The state of Delaware—long considered the most important jurisdiction in 
developing business entity laws in the United States—has taken the lead in permitting not merely 
the modification of default fiduciary duties, but their elimination by contract.”). 
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Dean Vestal made a similar proposal in the field of partnership law 
almost two decades ago.232 Vestal’s analysis of the constitutional 
dimensions of the internal affairs rule as applied to partnerships are likely 
applicable to LLCs as well,233 but we could also learn from Europe. The 
Inspire Art case234 may not have resolved all questions about the application 
of real seat jurisdiction company laws to pseudo-foreign firms under the EU 
treaty. And to the extent that EU charter provisions permit some regulation 
of pseudo-foreign companies, an EU-U.S. comparison could be instructive. 
Christoph Allmendinger, a legal expert from Germany, has recently 
undertaken the task. He compares the extent to which U.S. and European 
jurisdictions may regulate pseudo-foreign corporations under the 
Commerce Clause and EU treaty, respectively, and concludes that as 
compared to the EU charter, the U.S. constitutional framework may afford 
states broader discretion to regulate such companies.235 
There are doubtless other examples where comparative study of 
European and U.S. business association laws will be productive. If scholars 
and other students of comparative company law are to embark on such 
inquiries, they would be well-advised to first relax the traditional scholarly 
focus on competition and convergence of business association laws as the 
inevitable byproduct of jurisdictional competition under the internal affairs 
rule. May this Article mark a small first step in that direction. 
                                                                                                                                       
 232. Allan W. Vestal, Choice of Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Partners Under the Revised 
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 234. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
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